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Abstract:
Lawrence, Massachusetts is one of many "forgotten cities" characterized by high vacancy
and crime rates as well as the outsourcing of the manufacturing industry. Yet with the
recent redevelopment plans for a number of underutilized mills clustered in the
downtown, stakeholders in the community believe Lawrence is on the brink of an urban
renaissance. This thesis is intended to assist a coalition of property owners who are in the
process of forming a business improvement district (BID) to enhance their investments in
the mill district. However, these stakeholders face a dilemma: they must form a
partnership with a city government that lacks capacity and rely on faulty BID enabling
legislation in order to collectively leverage district improvements.
Through case study analysis of BIDs, this thesis identifies key barriers to BID formation
and provides recommendations on how best to overcome them. It also recommends that
the Massachusetts BID enabling legislation be changed by removing the opt-out clause.
Targeted at stakeholders in Lawrence and other forgotten cities in Massachusetts with an
interest in forming a BID, two primary conclusions are drawn. First, a public-private
balance of power shaped by way of a legal contract that outlines the city's and BID's role
in forgotten cities is essential. Second, BID planners in Massachusetts, because of the
opt-out clause in the enabling legislation, need to conduct additional outreach to property
owners in the district.
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Chapter I: Introduction
After decades of American suburbanization following World War II, the shift in jobs and
population left urban centers with a void filled by increased crime, poverty and vandalism.
Recently, however, many of the country's downtowns have been experiencing signs of
revitalization. People are returning to cities to enjoy arts, culture, shopping, eating and
entertainment. The overall 'urban lifestyle' has become more attractive and many cities are
experiencing an increase in residents, a true sign of revitalization.
The overarching term 'urban revitalization' encompasses a number of indicators such as
the investment and development of new properties and businesses in the district; increased sales
and property values; and decreased vacancy rates, vandalism and crime. While an amalgamation
of factors including micro- and macroeconomics, policy initiatives, and infrastructure
improvements may spur urban revitalization, urban planners utilize a range of tools to help
initiate, supplement, leverage and direct these factors. One such tool that is now widely used to
stimulate and manage the revitalization of commercial districts is a business improvement
district (BID).
A BID, by definition, is when property owners within a specific boundary place an
additional levy on themselves to obtain a variety of services for their district. The BID model
emerged Toronto in 1970, spread to the United States in 1975 and became widespread in the
1980s and 1990s. The tool was, and still is, particularly useful in downtowns when limited local,
state, and federal governments cut back on resources. Property owners have used the model to
supplement the services their city governments provide in order make their districts safer,
cleaner, and more competitive in the greater retail, office, and real estate marketplace. Property
owners, city officials, and other stakeholders across the globe have intentionally transferred and
imported the BID model by studying best practices in other districts. Through this mechanism of
'tool transfer' stakeholders have utilized BIDs to revitalize districts across North America,
Europe, South Africa and New Zealand.' Its widespread transfer is a testament that BIDs are an
effective tool for revitalizing commercial districts.
I Hoyt, Lorlene. "Importing Ideas: The Transnational Transfer of Urban Revitalization Policy."
International Journal of Public Administration 29 (2006): 221-243.
Despite the widespread use of the model, many BID advocates have been unable to
import the tool into their own districts because of certain place-based characteristics that make
this transfer difficult. For example, few cities in Massachusetts have been able to institute the
model due to the Commonwealth's BID enabling legislation that allows property owners to opt-
out of the district after formation. In addition, "forgotten cities," America's small, poor, post-
industrial cities, have had difficulty importing the tool because of the complex public-private
power struggle that is particularly prevalent in these areas. If planners in the five forgotten cities
in Massachusetts-Lawrence, Chelsea, Fall River, Holyoke, and New Bedford-want to use the
BID model as a revitalization tool in their commercial districts, they will have to overcome both
of these obstacles in order to successfully implement the model.
Forgotten Cities
The term "forgotten city" was coined by MIT Professor Lorlene Hoyt to describe 150 of
America's small, poor cities that have experienced periods of dominance and decline as part of
the rise and fall of the manufacturing-based economy. These cities are post-industrial, (having a
population of more than 5,000 by 1800); small (between 15,000 and 150,0000 residents); and
poor (with median household incomes of less than $35,000).2 The transfer of the BID model is
difficult in forgotten cities because the manufacturing industry has many times left their
downtown commercial districts with dilapidated infrastructure and vacant mills. Unlike in major
urban office and retail centers in New York or Los Angeles, when BIDs are used as a
revitalization tool in forgotten cities, lower property values translate to lower BID budgets and a
smaller array of services. On the other hand, because these cities' governments lack spending
capacity and they have not experienced the urban renaissance that larger cities have recently
enjoyed, forgotten city downtowns can benefit even more from the tool than their larger,
corporate counterparts. In small post-industrial cities, the need for the BID model is greatest but
the capacity is least.
Massachusetts Cities
Cities in Massachusetts face an additional barrierin implementing the BID model. The
Commonwealth's BID enabling legislation allows property owners to opt-out within 30 days
2 Hoyt, Lorlene and Andre Leroux. Voices from Forgotten Cities: Innovative Revitalization
Coalitions in America's Older Small Cities. PolicyLink and CHAPA: 2007.
after forming a district. This clause makes a main staple of the BID model--equity, or the notion
that everyone pays and everyone benefits-null and void and creates a 'free rider' problem. In
Massachusetts' small cities, where property owners tend to know each other well, the opt-out
clause is especially difficult because certain stakeholders feel they are continually investing in
the district while others take a back seat. In order to generate property owner buy-in and as an
essential part of BID implementation, all BID advocates must illustrate how the model has
effectively revitalized other downtowns. This outreach is not difficult in cities where
neighboring commercial districts utilize the model because when property owners can see how
the tool has given their competition an advantage, they are more likely to want to transfer the
model to their own districts. But the lack of BIDs in Massachusetts, due to either the perception
or reality that the opt-out clause will make BID formation impossible, has required additional
outreach to property owners in the Commonwealth.
In this thesis I will examine the following research questions: How can the BID model be
successfully implemented in 1) small, poor, post industrial, or "forgotten" cities and 2) cities in
Massachusetts? By investigating lessons learned from both of these types of BID models, I will
answer my primary research question: Are BIDs an effective tool for Massachusetts' forgotten
cities?
Audience
This research is intended for two audiences. Generally, this thesis is written for property
and business owners, elected officials, community organizations, and other stakeholders in
Massachusetts' forgotten cities with an interest in importing the BID model. While BID
advocates in this specific set of cities-Lawrence, Chelsea, Fall River, Holyoke, and New
Bedford-are the most direct audience, stakeholders in other cities in Massachusetts, as well as
forgotten cities outside the Commonwealth, are the secondary audience, particularly in chapters
that directly relate to them. Specifically, this thesis is intended for local stakeholders in the city
of Lawrence; a forgotten city in Massachusetts, where a number of property owners are seeking
to apply the BID model to enhance their recent investments in the downtown mill district.
Methods
In order to provide recommendations to stakeholders in Lawrence on how best to
overcome these barriers, I investigated three forgotten cities that utilized business improvement
districts to revitalize their downtowns, as well as the only three cities that have operational BIDs
in Massachusetts.
I interviewed the Executive Directors of the BIDs in the forgotten cities of Hartford, CT;
Ithaca, NY; and York, PA. Out of 150 forgotten cities, only a fraction has operational business
improvement districts in their downtowns. Out of this group, I chose these three cities because
of their very different characteristics. While most forgotten cities do not reap benefits from
institutional or corporate anchor institutions like that of a large metropolis, the insurance industry
cluster in Hartford gives the city a unique advantage while Ithaca benefits from its anchor
institution, Cornell University. On the other hand, York lacks a corporate or institutional anchor
of a similar, national magnitude. My original intention in choosing these cities was to determine
if a BID in a forgotten city might lack capacity due to a lack of corporate members or anchor
institutions like those in or surrounding BIDs in large cities like Philadelphia, Los Angeles or
New York. However, I found that the difficulty in transferring the tool to forgotten cities has
less to do with anchor institutions, and more with finding the right balance in a public-private
partnership where the public side lacks capacity.
To determine how the tool has been successfully transferred in Massachusetts, I
interviewed Executive Directors of BIDs in Hyannis, Springfield, and Westfield, MA. I also
interviewed BID proponents in Massachusetts, the BID Coordinator for the Commonwealth, BID
consultants, economic development professionals, and property owners in the Lawrence mill
district. Lessons learned from these interviews and case studies are featured throughout this
thesis with the intention of assisting similar stakeholders in adopting the tool.
Organization
Readers are encouraged to treat this thesis as a reference guide, exploring the chapters
that interest or apply to them most. Chapter II offers a summary and brief literature review on
what the BID model is, its history, how and why it forms, its capabilities, as well as BID debates.
Chapter III examines how the forgotten city case study communities were able to overcome
barriers in BID formation and service delivery, while Chapter IV examines how communities
have coped with the Massachusetts legislation and formed districts in spite of the opt-out clause.
Next, Chapter V gives the reader a brief history and demographic information of Lawrence, its
downtown mill district, and the impressive amount of new redevelopment and investment
projects that are occurring or in the pipeline there. This chapter is intended to set the stage for
Chapter VI, which considers the feasibility of the model in Lawrence, a forgotten city in
Massachusetts.
With this information available, it is my hope that communities in other forgotten cities
and/or in Massachusetts will be better equipped to determine if the BID model is an appropriate
tool for revitalization of their commercial center. As will be demonstrated in this report, a BID
model will be most effective in formation and implementation if property owners and the
municipal government agree upon their relationship to the BID before formation, and keep their
economic development activities and goals transparent and corresponding.
Chapter II: Business Improvement Districts: Relevant Lessons for Key
Stakeholders
Are American downtowns experiencing a renewal? If they are, implicit in the word
'renewal' is that that these downtowns were once without vigor. A number of scholars have
recently pointed to the trend toward downtown revitalization. One such scholar, Alan
Greenblatt, summarizes American downtowns' fall and rise in the last several decades stating,
"after World War II, suburban job and population growth in the United States far outstripped that
of cities, leading many to worry that downtowns were doomed. In recent years, however, many
cities have revived their fortunes by fashioning downtowns that are attractive and-for the first
time in decades--drawing new residents." 3 Residents are finding a downtown lifestyle
attractive because of the proximity to not only places of employment, but also local shops,
restaurants and entertainment venues. As Greenblatt notes, "once-forlorn urban centers from San
Diego to Philadelphia are now busy construction zones that are filling up with trendy shops and
restaurants."4
Despite urban centers making a comeback, strong federal policy on urban issues is
lacking.5 Therefore, a number of cities have had to get creative about planning and financing
mechanisms for revitalization in commercial districts. One such method, a business
improvement district (BID), has been used successfully as a commercial district revitalization
tool and transferred both within the United States and abroad. Policy makers, property owners
and other stakeholders have intentionally studied the best practices of successful BIDs in order to
implement the BID as a revitalization tool in their own districts. This practice of studying and
importing the model has been called 'tool transfer' or 'policy transfer' in BID literature. 6 While
BIDs have been transferred to both large cities and within large cities (such as Los Angeles, San
Diego and Philadelphia) and to small cities and suburban areas alike, some communities have to
overcome additional barriers to make the transfer successful.
3 Greenblatt, Alan. "Downtown Renaissance: Are Center Cities Finally Returning to Health?"
Congressional Quarterly Researcher 16.24 (2006): 553-576.
4 Ibid.
5 "In Search of a Real Urban Policy," Editorial. New York Times 19 February 2008.
6 Hoyt, Lorlene. "Importing Ideas: The Transnational Transfer of Urban Revitalization Policy."
International Journal of Public Administration 29 (2006): 221-243.
What is a BID?
A Business Improvement District (BID) is a special assessment district in which property
and business owners of a defined area elect to contribute a common fee to supplement or
enhance services already provided by their local government. State enabling legislation sets the
stage for BIDs, as they are binding legal agreements that are authorized by government and
differ in structure depending on their state's legislation. While enabling legislation may
determine specific types of services a BID may provide, by and large these include the
maintenance, development, marketing and promotion of the commercial district. Typically
public-private partnerships, BIDs have been successful across the United States and abroad in
revitalizing commercial districts because they create a stable management structure and provide
a dependable revenue stream to fund improvements.
Why do BIDs Form?
Private property owners opting to place additional taxes on themselves is conceptually
remarkable. Paul Levy, Executive Director of Center City District BID in Philadelphia, explains
this incongruity, writing, "normally tax-averse business people-corporate property owners and
managers, and small retailers-are choosing to be assessed an extra mandatory charge in order to
finance business improvement districts."7 The reasons for BID formation vary from place to
place, but as Lawrence O. Houstoun explains in his book on BIDs, these reasons usually fall into
one of two categories: fear or opportunity. Examples of fears that can motivate formation
include a combination of events such as a large employer leaving town, increasing vacancy rates
and decreasing property values, competition from suburban shopping centers, or the stigma of
inner-city crime. Opportunities might include the opening of a new convention center or a major
event that might cause the sense that "company is coming, but we're not ready for prime time." 8
During the decades when major decentralization occurred, city merchants were not only
disadvantaged by the accessibility and convenience of regional area malls, chain stores and
restaurants that were causing them to lose market share, but also by these institutions'
management capacity. Houstoun explains this shift and void, stating, "In the days when
downtowns dominated their regions, widespread participation of merchants and property owners
7 Houstoun, Lawrence O. Jr. Business Improvement Districts. Washington: The Urban Land
Institute, 2003.
8Ibid.
gave their associations the power to shape urban investments. But with the dominance of
national chains, real estate investment trusts, and absentee ownership, these voluntary
organizations usually lack strong leaders and cannot sustain themselves on member
contributions." 9
The shift in management and collaboration amongst business and property owners can
also be explained by the shift in the U.S. economy at large. When the primary industry in many
cities was manufacturing, the main concerns of business owners was cheap land and access.
Today, in the post-industrial economy, quality of life has become just as important for many
industries and workers have come to expect a number of amenities. Many retail, office and
medical centers with numerous tenants are managed by a single entity. Tenants pay a common
area maintenance (CAM) fee and receive services, such as security, cleanliness, and promotional
activities in return. The need for centralized urban commercial district management like that of
suburban competitors was apparent to the late urbanist William H. Whyte, who wrote in 1988,
"some cities are trying to compete with the shopping malls by copying the physical form of
them...What they should be copying is the centralized management of them: their ability to
coordinate tenant selection, promotion, leasing, and market research."'1 A number of BID
directors interviewed for this thesis agreed that BIDs are not just financing tools or service
delivery organizations but management organizations that rely on centralized amalgamation of
their district's property owners for success.
Urban business and property owners lacked not only a centralized organization, but also
government support like that of their suburban competitors during the era of decentralization. As
people continued to move out of cities following World War II, the United States Congress
represented and was accountable to fewer urban constituents. During the first two years of the
Reagan Administration, programs for cities were cut by nearly a quarter and Carter's Office of
Neighborhoods was eradicated. Federal revenue sharing, where federal money was allocated to
local government, was also cut. Ironically, the lack of federal funding and oversight has
motivated downtown business and property owners to take revitalization into their own hands.
MIT Assistant Professor Lorlene Hoyt explains how "the withdrawal of federal agencies has
done more for the cities than all previous federal activities combined. Now you have business
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
improvement districts, universities and hospitals partnering with cities and raising resources in
creative ways."" One of those creative ways is the business improvement district.
The first BID was created in Toronto in 1970, the model was transferred to New Orleans
in 1975 and became widespread in the 1980s through policy transfer. 12 In a 1999 study, Jerry
Mitchell found that almost 60% of BIDs were created since 1990 and nearly 28% were
established since 1995.13 Paul Levy explains this build-up and rapid transfer of the model,
stating:
It is understandable that when successive mayors and city councils lost general revenue
sharing and other federal programs in the 1980s, they allocated their scarce resources to
neighborhoods where voters lived. But, given the dense concentration of people
downtown each day, it should have been no surprise that increased litter, graffiti, and a
rise in homelessness were a consequence of cutbacks. When the commercial office boom
of the late 1980s ran headlong into this maelstrom of disorder and diminished public
resources, a business improvement district became a necessity by 1990.14
Transfer of the BID Model
Today, there are probably several hundred BIDs in the United States, but because new
BIDs are forming frequently it is impossible to have exact information on the number of
organizations. Jerry Mitchell's survey in 1999 found 404 BIDs located in 42 states and
Washington, D.C. Is During the writing of this thesis, in Massachusetts alone, there were several
communities- Amherst, Taunton, Newton, Chicopee and Hingham-that were studying the
feasibility of a BID in their community while one, Northampton, was in the early stage of
formation. 1" Every BID manager interviewed for this thesis had experiences to varying degrees
of other organizations asking them for advice on how to properly form and use the BID model in
their district. Paul Levy, who manages Philadelphia's Center City District (CCD), one of the
largest BIDs (in terms of budget and range of services) in the country, had so many requests for
technical assistance about BID formation from other communities that he hired an additional
"11 Greenblatt, Alan.
12 Ibid.
13 Mitchell, Jerry. "Business Improvement Districts and the 'New' Revitalization of Downtown."
Economic Development Quarterly 15 (2001): 115-123.
14 Levy, Paul R. "Paying for the Public Life." Economic Development Quarterly 15 (2001): 124-
131.
15 Mitchell, Jerry.
16 Phone interview with Ann Burke, Vice President, Economic Development Council of Western
Massachusetts, 19 February 2008.
staff person to manage these requests. 17 Communities now pay large sums of money (in L.A.
around $75,000 per contract) 18 to hire consultants whose primary service is to assist them in BID
formation. These trends point to the fact that BIDs are now revered as a tool that is successful in
revitalizing commercial districts.
Bid Debates
Even though there is little quantitative proof or literature on the effectiveness of BIDs at
reducing vacancies or increasing property values, few disagree that BIDs have played an
important role in downtown revitalization. 19 However, BIDs remain the subject of debate,
primarily surrounding the notion of the privatization of public space. Lorlene Hoyt and Devika
Gopal-Agge group these concerns as five main questions: "Are BIDs democratic? Are BIDs
accountable? Do BIDs create wealth-based inequalities in the delivery of public services? Do
BIDs create spillover effects? Do BIDs over-regulate public space?" 20 Because the structure of a
BID involves a small number of board members who ultimately make major decisions about the
service area, critics argue that BIDs concentrate power and generate services to the wealthy, thus
diverting dollars and attention from other neighborhoods, while crime spills over to them.
At the heart of these concerns is the notion of the public-private partnership. Because
BIDs have an effect on public space, should they be managed by a private entity? Hoyt, Gopal-
Agge, and Levy use evidence that in Mitchell's survey 87% of BID revenues come from self-
assessments and not privatized city contracts to counter the argument that BIDs divert city
services.21 Ann Burke, Vice President of the Economic Development Council of Western
Massachusetts and consultant to communities forming BIDs in the Commonwealth, further
argues this point by saying that services should be strictly supplementary to city services and
should be activities that the city should never be doing in the first place. Just like a city
17 Meeting with Paul Levy, Executive Director, Center City District Philadelphia, 15 February
2008.
18 Phone interview with Miranda Pastor, Los Angeles Office of the City Clerk, BID Program
Director. 2 April 2008.
19 Briffault, Richard. "A Government for Our Time? Business Improvement Districts and Urban
Governance." Columbia Law Review 99.2 (1999): 365-477.
20 Hoyt, Lorlene. and D.Gopal-Agge. "The Business Improvement District Model: A Balanced
Review of Contemporary Debates." Geography Compass 1.4 (2007): 946-958.
21 Ibid.
government would never intervene in mall security, cleanliness, or marketing, city governments
should not intervene in supplemental management services in a commercial district. 22
But to draw on this analogy further, mall managers are free to regulate their service area
as they see fit (within legal limits, of course) and unlike downtowns, can open and close their
doors to the public. Just as malls provide services to their customers, BIDs "improve the
physical, economic and social conditions within their geographical jurisdiction in a way that
serves their own interests and those of their customers." 23 But who are the customers of BIDs?
Property owners, of course, have to buy into the BID model and pay the fee, but the city, who
should represent the public interest in this public space, is also an essential customer. After all,
in most states the legislation requires municipalities to approve BIDs. This city buy-in is why
many BID 'how to' guides stress the importance of including the city early in the planning
stages. Unlike malls, BIDs deliver private services in public space and this is why a private-
public partnership is vital.
Even if BID revenues come strictly from self-assessments, and provide services that are
strictly supplemental to city services, critics still argue that they can change the fabric of a
neighborhood to be less authentic; presenting with sophisticated marketing plans, signage,
streetscapes, and uniformed ambassadors greeting visitors. Paul Levy responds to this notion of
'Disneyfication' asking, "Were our city centers more 'authentic' when they were abandoned at
night, lathered with graffiti, and plagued by crime?" 24 This discourse is similar to that of the
long-standing debate about gentrification, that is, the changing social and economic fabric of a
neighborhood that displaces residents.
While there has been case study research on the impacts of BIDs at the local level (like
that of BIDs' impact on property values in New York City or crime spillover from BIDs in
Philadelphia) 25 possibly the reason why there is not a more comprehensive study of the impact
of BIDs is because their social and economic effects are different on a case by case basis. As
Hoyt and Gopal-Agge conclude in their article summarizing the debates surrounding BIDs,
"researchers and practitioners alike caution that prior to BID adoption it is important to devise
22 Phone interview with Ann Burke.
23 Hoyt, Lorlene. "Planning Through Compulsory Commercial Clubs: Business Improvement
Districts." Economic Affairs 25.1 (2005) : 24-27.
24 Levy, Paul.
25 Hoyt, Lorlene. and D.Gopal-Agge.
and employ reliable methods of prospective policy evaluation. That is, advocates should undergo
a public process whereby they critically assess the implications and potential effects of the BID
model." 26 It is also important for BID stakeholders to determine the goals of BID formation
early on. This way, performance evaluation can be based on milestones that are specific
(decreased crime, increased property values, increased sales) to the revitalization goals of the
district and the city overall.
The BID Process
With the increasing number of BIDs forming today, there is a number of BID 'how to
guides' that explain the BID formation process to communities wanting to establish a BID. One
of the first such guides was published in 1995 by The New York City Partnership entitled, The
BID Manual: Establishing and Managing a Business Improvement District. The manual
describes the BID process as having three phases: planning and outreach, formal approval and
operation. 27 This thesis will examine the planning stages and formal approval stages in order to
provide lessons learned to districts hoping to import the BID model.
Planning
The initial planning of a BID can come from a number of sources-community
development corporations, business owners, civic organizations, or a mayor or city officials.
Several BID managers interviewed for this thesis have stressed the importance of having BID
formation start in the private sector. Stacey Irving, who is the Assistant Director of the Center
City District and in charge of providing technical assistance to smaller, neighboring BIDs,
explains that when the BID concept is generated from the mayor, property owners view the BID
as a tax increase. Ms. Irving also stresses the importance of a BID piggybacking on an existing
organization that is already familiar with the community.28 The BID Manual emphasizes the
importance of the sponsoring organization's strength as well, and reads, "no BID effort will
succeed without the active support of a local sponsoring organization that is willing to undertake
the work" and outlines traits that the sponsor must have as "1) extensive knowledge of the
26 Ibid.
27 Houstoun, Lawrence.
28 Meeting with Stacey Irving, Assistant Director, Center City District, 15 February 2008.
community and a history of involvement with it; 2) skill at organizing and gaining the support of
property owners and merchants; 3) a board of directors or membership that is representative of
the interests of property owners and tenants in the proposed district; and 4) a vested interest in
the long-term economic sustainability of the area and a reputation for seeking positive change
within the community." 29
The planning process is a lot of work and can take several years. A study by the Atlantic
Group that looked at six major BIDs from across the United States and twelve BIDs in New
York City and found that the average time spent in planning and organizing was 18 months for
BIDs outside New York, but 30 months inside the City because of an extra step required in the
law. 30 BID legislation can greatly affect the planning process. Massachusetts, whose BID
legislation also has an extra step in the law, is a peculiar case that will be examined further in
Chapter IV. The manual published by the Massachusetts Department of Housing and
Community Development entitled, A Guide to Establishing A BID in Massachusetts states that
the planning process, which is "consensus building, marketing of the BID to property owners,
developing an improvement plan to address district needs, and establishing or identifying a
management entity to implement the plan" takes ten to twenty months and the entire process can
take, on average, about a year and a half.31 Even though careful planning is vital, Houstoun also
warns against taking too much time to plan, stating, "Experience teaches that momentum
strengthens consensus building. Business leaders quickly tire of seemingly endless meetings. A
businesslike process can do much to inspire interest and a drawn-out process can turn interest
off."32 Complicated enabling legislation present in Massachusetts can hinder Houstoun's
business-like timeline recommendation not only just administratively but also, as explored later,
because it requires advocates to conduct additional outreach during the planning stage.
In their 'how to' manual, the Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community
Development, the entity overseeing BIDs in the Commonwealth, provides an outline of the
essential planning steps to take in order to form a BID. These steps are outlined in Figure 1,
below.
29 Houstoun, Lawrence.
30 Ibid.
31 Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Development. A Guide to
Establishing a BID in Massachusetts.
32 Houstoun, Lawrence.
Figure 1: Typical BID Formation Steps
One major point in BID formation that will be explored later, because it is especially pertinent in
forgotten cities in Massachusetts, is the door-to-door "test marketing" of the plan, which really is
more of stakeholder outreach, education and advocacy (see Chapter VI, Figure 9B for how this
step differs in Massachusetts and forgotten cities).
Once communities go through the initial planning process, they may find that a BID is
not feasible in their district. Ms. Irving cites that there are two main reasons many communities
are not able to support a BID. Either they lack enough assessed value to function as a BID, or
they lack expertise, or both. Expertise is important in navigating the politics in stakeholder
outreach and dealing with administrative and legal steps of BID formation within the timeline
outlined by the state legislation. Ms. Irving says the Center City District provided technical
assistance to help start eleven or twelve new BIDs in Philadelphia. But for those eleven or
twelve, there were 30 or 40 organizations seeking technical assistance that were not able to
become BIDs because they lacked the financial resources or the technical expertise.
Staffing
The latter reason for failure in BID formation is why a qualified BID manager is so
A. Planning Stage: Conceptual
o Form a sponsoring organization with a board of directors of membership that is
representative of the property owners and tenants in the district.
o Develop list of services that the BID could provide.
o Describe possible boundaries of the district.
o Make estimates of the revenues that could be generated at different levels of assessment.
o Evaluate the impacts of different levels of assessment on individual property owners.
o Determine what level of services can be funded at various revenue levels.
o Prepare conceptual service plan.
B. Planning Stage: Advanced
o Prepare a preliminary plan and budget that includes a description of services and costs and
the proposed district boundaries.
o Test-market the plan and budget in a meeting and in door-to-door discussions with the
property owners and merchants in the proposed district.
o Finalize a multiyear plan and budget that includes an estimate of the costs for each
property owner.
o Prepare a feasibility study that documents why the recommended services are needed and
summarizes the planning process to date.
essential to the success of the BID. As a management organization, the BID must be able to
navigate the bureaucracy of city and state protocols, maintain a budget, coordinate services,
become accountable to a board of directors and members, and respond to press and political
pressure. While all of these activities are part of the operational stage of the BID process, they
are important to keep in mind in the planning stages. Ms. Irving explains that many communities
simply do not have someone with the capability and expertise to perform the role of managing
the BID. She cited one neighboring BID manager who called and asked her if the Center City
District offered a payment plan to their members. Because this manager was even asking this
question (to which the answer was no) revealed to her that the organization did not understand
how the BID depends on a constant source of revenue. She also cited other operational
problems that neighboring BIDs had-such as not knowing how to collect assessments, file liens
and judgments, and deal with community problems outside their capacity, such as crime or
education. Her fear was that many of these BIDs would self-destruct due to their lack of
expertise, and found this problem was especially troubling for BIDs with smaller budgets and
influence, which may not be able to financially support a large staff or even one or two full time
personnel with experience and expertise. Houstoun agrees on the importance of a strong
manager stating:
"A clear relationship exists between the salaries paid to the top employees and the
effectiveness of (and respect for) the BID's work. The executive or manager must be
multitalented in order to accomplish the diverse tasks involved in the job...parking,
security, public relations, construction and business permitting, urban design, and
business attraction and retention. Many skills are needed...a multitalented executive
should be paid accordingly." 33
Managing a BID is a challenging task, which may be a reason many BID managers
interviewed for this thesis spoke of high turnover rates in BID Directors. If BID planners have to
compromise between paying talented staff high salaries, and the number of services the BID can
provide, they should consider hiring the talented individuals who will be able to phase in services
according to the budget as the BID becomes more established.
Budget
Of course, staff salaries will depend on the BID's budget, which will depend on the level
33 Ibid.
of assessment generated from properties. Mitchell's survey found that the average budget for
BIDs was $200,000, but many budgets were well over $1,000,000. 34 One key in the feasibility
stage is to find the proper balance of financial support without spreading resources too thin. Ms.
Irving explained that many BIDs made the mistake of stretching out their boundaries to gain
additional property assessments but then found they did not have the organizational capacity to
spread their resources that far. Some state laws may dictate the maximum budget. According to
Massachusetts's legislation, the amount of the fee is established separately by each BID but
cannot exceed 1/2 of 1% (.005) of the total assessed value of the real property owned by
participating members in the district. "In planning a BID," Houstoun states, "compromise in
coverage and budget should be the last resort. When BIDs fail, the cause is likely to be that they
provide inadequate benefits, not that their assessments are too high." 35 The larger the budget, the
more likely that BIDs will be able to retain additional staff, increase the array of services
provided in the district, and therefore have the most capacity to make an impact in the district.
BIDs with budgets under six figures are more likely to experience staff turnover, need additional
technical assistance and provide a lower array of services to the district. 36
Services
A BID must also plan to provide services that are specific to their community and should
not make the planning mistake that Houstoun warns against as "copycat planning." 37 Even
though a BID is a tool that is transferred from community to community and it is important to
look at lessons learned from other BID models, the tool should not be transferred literally. Ms.
Irving explained that many smaller BIDs look at the comprehensive services that the Center City
District in Philadelphia, with a budget of nearly $20 million, provides and have unrealistic
expectations that a BID will make the same changes in their own communities.
Many communities have state enabling legislation or other distinctive qualities that make
the tool easier to import while others, more difficult. Small, post-industrial cities and cities in
Massachusetts fall into the latter category and may look at other models, through this thesis, so
34 Mitchell, Jerry.
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that they may learn lessons in successfully transferring the tool.
Key Lessons
In order to successfully transfer the BID model, advocates must look to the best practices
both to determine how the model can be utilized in their own district, and to illustrate what the
model can achieve to gain stakeholder buy-in. BID planners will want to keep the following key
lessons in mind when conducting BID feasibility studies:
Figure 2: Key BID Planning Lessons
1) The idea for a BID should come from the private sector, so as not to be mistaken for
a tax, but a BID is a public-private partnership that needs municipal support early on
in the planning process.
2) BIDs that piggyback on an existing organizations that have proven track records of
making positive impacts in the community benefit from extensive knowledge of the
district and stakeholder trust.
3) Stakeholders should determine the goals of the BID early on through a public
process that creates a method for policy evaluation.
4) Stakeholder outreach is key. Property owner buy-in is essential in BID formation.
5) BID planning is an investment that can take several years. Planners should be
diligent, especially in stakeholder outreach, but taking too much time will cause
property owners to lose interest.
6) Technical expertise in BID staff is essential and qualified directors demand higher
salaries. If potential BIDs have initial limited budgets and have to compromise
between services and qualified staff, planners should consider phasing services and
hiring qualified individuals.
7) The right combination of budget and services is essential. BIDs should have at least
a six-figure budget, but should not make boundaries too large to generate
assessments and then spread resources too thin.
8) The spread of the BID model is an example of tool transfer but planners should
avoid copycat planning. Stakeholders must come up with their own set of BID
services that will produce outcomes that are most essential to revitalizing their
specific districts.
Chapter III: BIDs in Forgotten Cities
What is a Forgotten City?
Although widespread tool transfer of the BID model is cited as evidence that BIDs
successfully revitalize downtowns, certain city characteristics make the transfer more difficult.
This is particularly true in small, poor and post-industrial cities. All three of these characteristics
are complementary and particularly symptomatic in a group of cities throughout the United
States. With the outsourcing of the manufacturing industry in the last several decades, most of
these small cities have had difficulty making the switch to a service-based economy as rapidly as
their larger counterparts, and are therefore not experiencing the urban renaissance at similar
intensities.
The term "forgotten city" was coined by MIT Professor Lorlene Hoyt as part of the
Department of Urban Studies and Planning Forgotten Cities Seminar to examine small post-
industrial cities that have experienced periods of dominance and decline. This term includes
cities with an industrial history having a population of more than 5,000 by 1800; small cities
with between 15,000 and 150,000 residents; and poor cities, with median household incomes of
less than $35,000. These criteria embody 150 cities in the United States and 7.4 million
people. 38 In their report on the thematic summary of forgotten city research, Voices from
Forgotten Cities: Innovative Revitalization Coalitions in America's Older Small Cities, Hoyt and
Andre Leroux make the further distinction that "unlike global cities and 'comeback' cities,
forgotten cities did not reap the benefits of a robust national economy in the late 1990s. Though
their needs are great, they have only very recently received attention from scholars and
policymakers."3 9 While larger cities tend to have institutional support-from corporations,
universities, hospitals, and foundations-that have helped their economies overcome
decentralization and post-industrialism, forgotten cities generally do not have this luxury.
Inherent in these cities with poor populations and limited economic drivers are municipal
governments that lack capacity and stretch limited resources, such as funding and services, too
thin. The BID model, which emerged in the United States in part from a void in government
support, may seem like an appropriate revitalization tool for a forgotten city experiencing a void
38 Hoyt, Lorlene and Andre Leroux.
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in institutional and municipal support and services. At the same time, these cities have difficulty
supporting a self-sufficient BID because they do not have a large corporate presence to provide
revenue, like that of many successful BIDs in large cities such as Philadelphia or New York.
Furthermore, forgotten city downtowns experience higher levels of vacancy and lower property
values than larger commercial urban markets.
Is the BID model a tool worth transferring to a forgotten city? If so, how might
stakeholders in such cities best utilize the tool to revitalize their downtowns? To answer these
questions, I will analyze how these 'forgotten city' characteristics impact BIDs by examining the
narratives of BIDs in three forgotten cities: Hartford, Connecticut; York, Pennsylvania; and
Ithaca, New York. Although these three cities all meet the "forgotten city" criteria outlined
above, they were chosen because each has its own unique characteristics that may influence the
BID model. While most forgotten cities lack a strong corporate or institutional presence, the
insurance industry cluster anchors downtown Hartford, while the city of Ithaca's major anchor
institution and economic driver is Cornell University. York, Pennsylvania, on the other hand,
has neither a major corporate or institutional anchor on a similar scale to Hartford or Ithaca.
Even though all three cities have varying degrees of major economic drivers, they share the fact
that their populations are poor and their municipal governments lack resources to prioritize
downtown revitalization. Stakeholders in these three forgotten cities have chosen to utilize the
BID model as a mechanism to revitalize their downtowns, and despite their dissimilar
characteristics, one they all share-limited municipal capacity-has been a major obstacle in
successful tool transfer.
Hartford, CT
The city of Hartford boasts a number of diverse and historic neighborhoods and assets
including the downtown central business district, Trinity College and Hartford University, a
large city park that abuts the Connecticut River, the Mark Twain House, the Governor's mansion
and its very own Little Italy. In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Hartford was a
major manufacturing city, but many factories have since closed or relocated. Although Hartford
has been able to transition to a service-based economy, the outsourcing of manufacturing jobs
coupled with flourishing nearby suburban developments and the construction of new highways
that intersect the downtown has caused an economic decline in the city beginning in the late
1950s.
Today, Hartford qualifies as a forgotten city but also has the benefit of being the
"insurance capital of the world" because many of the world's insurance companies are
headquartered here. Therefore, Connecticut's capital has advantages by already having a large
number of multinational corporations located in the downtown. At the same time, according to
the Census 2000, Hartford exhibited the second highest poverty rate in the country of cities with
a population of 100,000 or more. As of the U.S. 2000 Census, there were 121,578 people
residing in Hartford and about 30% were living under the poverty line. The median household
income was $24,820 while the median family income was $27,050. These numbers juxtapose a
downtown that has been historically inhabited by large corporations that provided white-collar
jobs. However, most of these workers commute from the suburbs, and because of crime and
poverty in the city, tend to frequent the city as infrequently as possible.
The Hartford Business Improvement District (HBID) can provide relevant lessons to
planners and stakeholders of potential BIDs because it was formed recently amidst a municipal
government that is stretched for resources and does not have the capacity to focus attention
downtown. The referendum to establish a BID was passed in October 2006 and HBID operations
began in January 2007. In an effort to formalize their fragmented services and support for
downtown, community and civic organizations such as Hartford Proud & Beautiful,
MetroHartford Alliance, Greater Hartford Arts Council, and Business for Downtown Hartford,
spent about three years formulating the Hartford BID, from conception to inception. These
organizations wanted not only to enhance the existing programs available to downtown business
and property owners, but also to change both the perception and reality of crime there.
Proponents thought these short term goals could be achieved by using the BID model, and that
public safety milestones would eventually lead to a long-term goal of revitalization: increased
property values, decreased vacancy rates, and an active business district where employees and
patrons would enjoy spending time.
According to the current HBID Executive Director who was also involved in the
formation process, Michael Zaleski, the idea for a BID in downtown Hartford was brought up
three times prior, but these previous attempts failed due to immediate lack of support from major
property owners. During the final attempt, Mr. Zaleski and other proponents of the BID knew
they needed to strategically pitch the idea in order to succeed. He explained that the top twenty
property owners (out of 251) in the district made up 90% of the assessed value, so the BID
planners needed them on board to make a viable organization. Zaleski says they had support
from about five of these twenty at the start, while the rest remained skeptical. Therefore, the
BID organizers spent about a year educating these major property owners, meeting with them
once a month. Their tactic was to reach out to them vis-a-vis their relationship with the chamber
of commerce, MetroHartford Alliance, and then approach smaller property owners using these
larger institutions as leverage.
Even though the idea of a BID came from the private sector, the major challenge for
Zaleski and the chamber in selling the BID concept to property owners was a lack of trust in the
city government and the belief that the BID would be used by the city like a tax. Similar to
property owners unfamiliar with the BID model in numerous cities, property owners in Hartford
saw the concept as additional taxes to the city for services that the city should be providing. The
BID proponents' counter argument was that this money would go not to the city, but directly
back to the members to use as they saw fit, and would only supplement city services.
Although Zaleski admits downtown Hartford has a corporate presence that most BID
Directors "would kill for," he says that this type of property owner may have been more difficult
to convince. Because multinational corporations like The Hartford or Aetna are responsible to
shareholders, their number one concern is the bottom line. Although their BID payments may
only be a miniscule line item in their operating budgets, it is one that has to get absorbed
somewhere on their balance sheet.
Another challenge in HBID's formation was that every company had different reasons to
want the BID model, and Zaleski and the chamber had to combine these into one pitch. For
example, major corporations, such as the insurance companies, were less concerned about clean
streets but wanted improvements in security to ensure their employees were safe. On the other
hand, the developer of a new apartment tower saw marketing of the downtown as a priority to
attract residents. Meanwhile, the BID concept was less attractive if property owners were also
users of the buildings because they could not pass through the costs to tenants.
Because the Connecticut BID legislation requires a double majority-50% of the
assessed value and 50% of the property owners must vote yes-Zaleski saw their outreach tactic
as achieving support from the assessed value first and then convincing half of the property
owners (with 251 properties, they needed support from 126). Because a small number of major
insurance companies own several properties, once they were on board, the outreach process
came down to convincing smaller property owners. While the property owners remained
hesitant, Zaleski persisted in monthly meetings and emphasized that a BID could formalize
services to downtown property owners in a fair, equitable manner because everyone will pay for
benefits that everyone will receive. In the end, before the BID sponsors brought the BID plan to
the city for referendum, the property owners came up with a list of six stipulations required for
their buy in, listed in Figure 3 below:
Figure 3: Conditions for major property owner support of a Hartford BID
As this list illustrates, property owners in Hartford had very specific requirements for
their support for the BID model. While many of these stipulations deal with accountability to
members that the BID will in fact promote positive changes in the district, Zaleski claims that the
financial support from the city 'sealed the deal' for property owners. He writes, "The city cash
contribution was seen as critical because the owners did not want the city stepping away from its
regular duties and relying on this new revenue source to complete their basic work. I'd say the
1. Negotiation of a satisfactory commitment from the City of Hartford that maintains
and seeks to increase services in the district;
2. Setting the mill rate assessment for the BID at 1 mill (1 mill is equal to $1 for
every $1,000 worth of assessed value);
3. Inclusion of a provision in the municipal ordinance that requires significant
representation of the major property owners on the board of commissioners;
4. Inclusion of a sunset provision in the municipal ordinance that requires a
reauthorization of the district after 3 years;
5. Inclusion of specific language in the municipal ordinance regarding the
dissolution of the district if the property owners are not satisfied with either the
operation of the district or City compliance with the memorandum of
understanding; and
6. Development of very clear measurements to determine whether the BID is
successful and is accomplishing the goals that are envisioned.
commitment by the City to not decrease services and consider expanding services was just as
important as the cash contribution." 40
In the end, Zaleski's efforts were more successful than he imagined and the referendum
passed with 70% of the properties and 78% of the assessed value voting yes (he notes that a
challenge was that a non-response was equivalent to a no vote and some properties were owned
by trusts or LLCs, without local management, and were therefore hard to reach). He says that
despite the property owners' feeling that that the city is not doing enough for downtown, a
public-private partnership is able to function because the organization has been intentionally
stripped down to supplemental services. While the property owners want complete control of the
BID revenue, Zaleski says that the city would never let the BID take on too much authority
either. He describes the relationship as a balance of power in which "the city always retains
ultimate control."41
The 23-person Board of Commissioners (representation in accordance with requirement
#3, above), decided that the BID's priorities would be 'safe and clean.' However, as Zaleski
says, it is really "safe, safe, safe, clean." He works with a $1,214,400 budget and his top
priorities are #1) public safety-both perception and reality of, #2) cleaning the district, and #3)
marketing the district, for which he has only a modest budget. As the only person on staff,
Zaleski has placed numerous security ambassadors on the street. He has tripled the number of
street sweepers in the area, oversees a beautification program that removes graffiti within 24
hours of its appearance and placed several hundred new flower planters throughout the district.
His tertiary marketing and promotional efforts are in the works as well.
Zaleski admits that his biggest challenge now is working on how to communicate with
property owners. He says most members are not highly involved and because of their
stipulations (outlined in Figure 3), he must be sure to document and take credit for HBID's work
and provide a quarterly newsletter of his achievements.
The trend towards downtown Hartford's revitalization is promising. An increasing
number of shops, arts and cultural resources, as well as restaurants and bars have opened
downtown. Downtown housing development is also increasing and, Zaleski says, the area is
supposed to grow from 2,000 residents to 6,000 in the next few years. Moreover, suburbanites
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who once perceived downtown Hartford as a crime stricken area that they would endure only for
employment are now coming into downtown for entertainment during nights and weekends.
Still, Zaleski says the image of Hartford has a long way to go and the BID is no silver bullet but
only a piece of the puzzle.
York, PA
Known as White Rose City (after the War of the Roses between England's House of
Lancaster and House of York), York was one of the first capitals of the United States (following
Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Lancaster). York's other claim to fame is the York Peppermint
Patty, which was created there in 1940. This small historic city has a small town ambience and
boasts a number of cultural assets, including the historic York Fair, which claims to be the
country's oldest fair, a performing arts center, and a downtown retail district.
The Census 2000 paints a picture of York as a forgotten city. With a population of
40,862 in 2000, the median household income was $26,475, and the median family income was
$30,762. About 20% of families and 23.8% of the population were below the poverty line. 42
The city has an industrial and manufacturing base, which has suffered from outsourcing in recent
years. In 2005 the Pfaltzgraff Company, which had been manufacturing in York since 1895,
closed down their plant. However, the area remains home to manufacturing arms of Harley-
Davidson, as well as weightlifting equipment and HVAC companies. Still, York City exhibits
crime rates and unemployment rates nearly twice that of the surrounding county.43
An important piece of the revitalization puzzle in any city is the city government, hence
why it is so important for BIDs to work with the municipality and share the same vision and
goals. And while HBID may provide an example of a business community that is hesitant in
their trust of the city, York, PA is an example of a downright corrosive public-private
partnership. The York Business Improvement District was approved by the city in 1998. That
same year, the already existing York Main Street program, a 501(c)3, and the BID merged under
the holding company, Downtown Inc. While the Main Street program is one block longer East
than the 18 square-block BID, the merging of the organizations made sense because they are able
42 American Fact Finder. United States Census Bureau 2000.
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to share overhead costs and programming activities as well as a joint mission. Because the Main
Street program can go after funding dollars that the BID cannot and raises almost the same
amount of revenue as the BID generates, Christina Mauhar, the Executive Director of Downtown
Inc., explains that this arrangement basically doubles the budget but property owners are only
paying half. The two organizations had separate boards until they recently merged in 2006,
which Mauhar admits was challenging due to the separate cultures linked to the business and
non-profit community. However, she points to the upside, which is a more active board, who
went from meeting twice per year to once a month.44
Like Hartford's BID, Downtown York Inc. is struggling to maintain a public-private
balance with a city government that lacks resources and capacity. But unlike Hartford, York's
political relationships have been broken to an extreme. Ms. Mauhar explains the city is on the
cusp on bankruptcy and is attempting to use Downtown Inc. to make up for their limited
capabilities.45 While the BID is currently generating revenue with a $1 million assessment, for
an annual operating budget of $106,000, the mayor, members of city government and city
council would like the assessment raised so the BID may provide more services. At the same
time, Downtown Inc. does not receive funding from the city and their in-kind services-office
space and use of the city website and phone-were taken away. Mauhar maintains that once the
Economic Development Director was pushing the millage increase and took away the in-kind
services, the relationship went sour and has continued to worsen since.
One issue that is central to this sour relationship is downtown law enforcement. Crime,
panhandling and loitering have lead to a perception and reality of an unsafe downtown. As one
York Daily Record writer notes, although "the downtown is starting to see millions of dollars in
investment in housing and business.... [potential residents of York are] weary of the sound of
gunfire, crime and too few police while shouldering the highest tax rate in the county." 46 The
York BID attempted to supplement the police service with an ambassador program. As part of
this program, personnel walked the district, greeted shoppers, gave directions and monitored any
criminal activity. Mauhar explains that this system did not deter crime because there was still a
lack of police presence and police could not respond quickly enough to the 'eyes and ears' of the
44Interview with Christina Mauhar, Executive Director, Downtown, Inc., 4 February 2008.
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ambassadors. Seeing that this program was not deterring crime, Downtown, Inc. board members
urged Mauhar to overhaul the ambassador program that they saw as a "waste" of $130,000
annually. 47 While Mauhar plans to change the ambassador program to focus mostly on sanitation
and marketing, city officials had another idea: they wanted Downtown, Inc. to pay for a 24/7
downtown police officer. After "persistent calls by city officials for the agency to fund
downtown police patrols," Downtown Inc. finally agreed to pledge $10,000 for a downtown
police presence, half of what the city had asked of them.48 Mauhar explains how the city
politically calculated their request for $20,000 by asking for the money in a City Council
meeting that aired on local television. When the BID board responded that their agency should
not pay for services that should be provided by the city, a headline in the following day's
newspaper read "Downtown Inc. doesn't support law enforcement." Therefore, Mauhar says, the
board voted to pledge the $10,000 as a goodwill gesture to show that the agency supported the
police. However, BID constituents feel like they are being double taxed to replace an over-
stretched city government who wants to pull their downtown resources and use them elsewhere.
The Pennsylvania legislation states that the governing authority, in this case the five-
person City Council of York, must vote to approve the BID district board members. The board
submits names to the mayor, who submits the names to the Council for approval. Mauhar says
that city oversight is supposed to be just that, and not a mechanism to place their own members
on the board. However, the city saw recent board turnover as an opportunity to gain power
within the agency and has tried to appoint board members without Downtown, Inc.'s knowledge.
After the mayor pushed to have Ken Schreiber, the city's marketing and economic development
coordinator, sit in on board meetings as a liaison for the city, York City Council approved his
appointment to a voting board member, even though his name was not one that the board had
submitted to Mayor John Brenner for approval. 49 Mauhar explains that Brenner, who has not
been able to raise revenue for downtown with city resources, gave Schreiber's name to City
Council himself, in an effort to utilize the agency to drive his own agenda. Mauhar, who was
interviewed for this thesis a day before the Council voted to approve Schreiber, claimed the
Downtown Inc. board might vote to dissolve themselves if Schreiber became a member. She
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said that while her constituents knew dissolving was an extreme and reactionary move, they saw
it as the only viable option to take control back from the city. She explained that because many
of Downtown York's property owners do not live in York and Brenner does not see them as
constituents who can vote him out of office, the BID board carries little political clout with city
officials. While the board of Downtown Inc. has not voted to dissolve as of yet, Mauhar notes
this could be possible because the members feel they are being told by the city government who
should sit on their board and how they should use their own money; essentially that they don't
know what is best for them.
As Mike Zaleski of Hartford said, this public-private relationship is really a balance of
power with the city always retaining the ultimate power. Downtown, Inc. has not been unable to
maintain this balance and thinks dissolution may be the way to counter what they see as an abuse
of power.
Ithaca, NY
Ithaca, located in central/upstate New York close to the Pennsylvania border, was once
internationally known for the Ithaca Gun Company, manufacturers of shotguns, and was home to
clock, auto, and other manufacturing industries as well. Surrounded by Cayuga Lake, Ithaca
boasts a picturesque setting complete with dams, world-renowned fossils, and waterfalls. During
the early twentieth century, Ithaca was the center of much of the silent film industry, which
benefited from the area's beautiful surroundings.
When people think of Ithaca today, they may immediately think of Cornell University,
politically liberal minded inhabitants, and, as the popular T-shirt suggests, gorges. However, as
a former industrial hub whose economy now rests on higher education and light manufacturing,
Ithaca also qualifies as a forgotten city. According to the Census 2000, the city of 29,287 had a
median household income of only $21,441. About 13.5% of families and 40.2% of the
population were living below the poverty line.5o
While like most forgotten cities, Ithaca's downtown business district does not have a
large corporate presence, Ithaca does have the advantage of being a university town and
50 American Fact Finder. United States Census Bureau 2000.
therefore exhibits existing demand for and supply of complimentary retail such as book stores,
coffee shops, art and craft dealers, independent cinema houses and locally-owned restaurants.
The central business district, Ithaca Commons, is a downtown pedestrian mall that was
built in 1974 in an effort to contrast decentralization. Not unlike urban retail in other forgotten
cities, Ithaca Commons has had to compete with expanding suburban commercial zones that
feature 'big-box' national chain stores and restaurants. In the 1990s, the Commons' vacancy
rates grew and the major retail anchors-Woolworth's, McDonald's and CVS-left downtown.
Gary Ferguson, Executive Director of what now is the Ithaca Downtown Partnership BID,
explains how like other forgotten cities, the political and social focus shifted away from
downtown. "By the mid 1990s it was starting to feel tired," he said in an interview with The
Ithacan Online. "What happens sometimes in communities, and I think it happened here, is we
make these good investments then we say 'I'm done. Let's move on to something else.' ...
Consequently there wasn't much more attention paid to downtown." 51
In order to refocus attention downtown, a group of stakeholders attempted to form a BID
in the district in 1995, but failed partially because the boundaries were too large and the mission
was too broad.52 While a majority of property owners (55%) voted to form the district in 1995,
the goal of a 75% commitment was not met. While the original plan was based on marketing
and business development, a new plan emerged in 1997 with a more strategic vision of 'safe and
clean.' The Ithaca Downtown Partnership (IDP) business improvement district was created in
1997 consisting of 22-blocks of retail space that includes Ithaca Commons. Today, the
Partnership operates with an annual budget of $525,000, $300,000 of which comes from
assessments while the rest is made up of city funding, grants, special events that generate
revenue, and miscellaneous contributions.
While Downtown York, PA may be the example of a poor public-private partnership,
Ithaca serves as the prime example of coordination and balance of power between the city and
BID. Ferguson explains that IDP maintains a close relationship with the city. New York state
law requires the city to hold seats on the BID board, but unlike York's city board member
contention, Ferguson says the city's three voting seats on the board has actually helped IDP
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maintain a strong relationship with local officials. Mr. Ferguson has been able to negotiate the
ability to sit in on city planning and economic development meetings and the city and the
Partnership are able to understand each other's missions and share similar agendas. The BID
benefits financially from this partnership as well. For example, the City of Ithaca recently
appropriated $250,000 for the BID's 2008 budget for a project called the Ithaca Commons
Reconstruction Design. Ferguson told The Ithacan Online that money will go toward "evaluating
and renovating The Commons", but he has not solidified the plans as of yet.53
While the Ithaca Downtown Partnership may have a close working relationship with the
city, Ferguson admits their relationship with the county is not as constructive. The county, who
is also the biggest landowner in the downtown, used to give financial support to IDP but pulled
their capital in the last few years. Unlike the city government, the county does not share a vision
with the BID and the relationship suffers from what Ferguson describes as "urban vs. rural and
city vs. suburb" politics. The county still retains a seat on IDP's board, a seat that is
controversial to IDP's members. However, Ferguson explains that IDP's relationship with the
county is useful because county officials run the local tax abatement program that is utilized by
IDP. Even with the two entities' different agendas (similar to York's BID/city relationship),
unlike York, Ferguson sees that this relationship is needed and therefore uses it to his advantage.
Once perceived as an organization that was simply a carry-over of the downtown
merchant association, IDP is now regarded as a major economic development player in the
region. IDP has been able to act as a catalyst in bringing $100 million in public and private
investment to the downtown. Such investment includes 120 new businesses (for a net of about
60 to 70), a new 225-unit housing project (the first new downtown housing since 1970), a 50%
increase in downtown office space, a restored historic theater, two new hotels, a five-plex cinema
and parking garages, plus fagade improvements, an ambassador program and a number of
popular festivals that have doubled in size. The IDP also spearheaded the effort to put the
downtown properties on the National Register of Historic Places.
Even with a small budget, the Partnership has been able to expand its focus from 'safe
and clean' to business retention and development, marketing and member services, and
community and special events. Because of their close relationship with the city, IDP has also
been able to become involved in local policy and environmental planning. Gary Ferguson attests
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to the importance of a shared community strategic vision in achieving success. He says IDP has
done this by preparing a "Downtown Ithaca Ten-Year Development Strategy." This strategic
plan provides guidelines for downtown development from 2000 - 2010 and was endorsed by the
city government. To support this plan, IDP commissioned an Entertainment Study and Strategy
Plan in 2006, to "reinforce downtown Ithaca as a central place to gather for amusement,
socialization and enjoyment, while attracting more people to interact and shop downtown, and
assisting in creating a desirable downtown residential neighborhood which will be attractive to
those attracted to an urban, downtown lifestyle." 54 Each year since 2000, IDP creates an annual
work plan that addresses a portion of this strategic 10-year plan.
The Public-Private Balance in Forgotten Cities
As is clear from the three forgotten city case studies, a balance of power between the city
government and a BID is more crucial in determining feasibility than the district's millage,
services, and budget size. This public-private relationship is especially important in forgotten
cities because these are places where city resources are limited but need is great.
Christina Mauhar warns that potential new BIDs should formulate their organization by
thinking of positions, not people. While a BID may be feasible under the current city
administration, it may not be able to maintain a public-private partnership if a new municipal
administration abuses power or does not understand the role of the BID. Therefore, new BIDs
should outline very specific responsibilities and relationships before forming, much like the
Hartford BID did. Such a document will provide a mechanism to protect property owners, which
is essential for city BIDs in forgotten cities. Other key lessons learned from all three forgotten
city BIDs are summarized in Figure 4 below:
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Figure 4: Key Lessons from Forgotten City BIDs
1) BID rids downtown OT tree-
rider problem
2) BID planners got key
players on board early and
knew whom other property
owners respected and
would listen to for buy-in.
3) Large, corporate property
owners generally have less
community interest.
4) Planners had to find the
right combination of
services to appeal to all.
5) Conditions of support
(services and capital) from
the city were vital in BID
formation.
6) Constant communication
with BID members is
challenging but necessary.
1) Dlu S plggyUoacrng oni
existing organizations helps
due to economies of scale.
2) City should not make
demands of BID if not
providing any technical or
financial support.
3) BID members feel the city
is using them to drive their
own agenda because there
is a lack of communication
and transparency between
the two entities.
I) imliaLU IA.UllUamli., IL' u LIU ,
too large and missions that
are too broad will not create
feasible BID organizations.
BID planners should start
small and rely on phasing
in subsequent years.
2) City board members
encourage transparency in
BID and city agendas.
Transparency has the
capacity to encourage city
funding and support.
3) Even if government and the
BID have different agendas
(i.e. BID and county in
Ithaca), the BID should
foster government
relationships to use to their
own advantage.
4) City and BID should keep
each other abreast of long-
term goals that compliment
each other.
While the Ithaca Downtown Partnership's healthy relationship with the city may be due in part to
the culture of these specific organizations, the roles and action steps outlined by both the city and
BID have cultivated this strong relationship. While the city has power over the BID by sitting on
the board, the city balanced the power by including Mr. Ferguson in city planning and policy
activity. This way, both parties are kept abreast of each other's plans and goals and can therefore
achieve a common vision for downtown Ithaca.
While state legislations vary in outlining the relationship between the BID and municipal
authority, no matter what the state, if this relationship is broken, the BID will not succeed. In
forgotten cities, where small-town politics collide with big financial resource gaps, a public-
private partnership is particularly essential. Even though the BID is supposed to be a tool for
property owner use to help manage and revitalize their district, the face of a downtown in a
forgotten city belongs to the community who has not forgotten it. Even though in many public-
private partnerships there is a constant struggle for power where the city remains in control,
property owners, and particularly members of BIDs in forgotten cities, must also leverage their
power. After all, in a city with limited resources, downtown property owners may be the city's
biggest resources. BID planners should be mindful of leveraging this power during the planning
stage, by encouraging the city to commit, at minimum, baseline services in the district. This
commitment should then encourage the public-private balance to transfer to the implementation
stage where just as BID and city services augment each other, so do each entity's economic
development strategies and goals.
Chapter IV: BIDs in Massachusetts
In the United States, state law authorizes local governments to enter into public-private
partnerships to form business improvement districts. As the case studies in the previous chapter
illustrate, these laws can, in the words of Houstoun, "profoundly shape the manner in which local
BIDs are created and governed and the functions they serve." 55 State legislation can determine
everything from who sits on the board, to the amount of property assessments that can be used as
a fee, and what percent of property owner approval (or disapproval) a BID boundary must
achieve in order to form. While research on the effectiveness of state enabling legislations on
BIDs is limited, Houstoun explains that "some states make it relatively easy for localities to
create BIDs, and others make BID formation relatively difficult, often out of a desire to protect
property owners from added assessments and without much regard for the likely benefits of BIDs
to property owners."56 Massachusetts is a state that falls into the latter category.
Massachusetts General Law Chapter 400, passed in 1995, enables communities to
establish a BID within contiguous boundaries where at least 75% of the land is zoned or used for
commercial, retail or industrial uses. Chapter 400 also requires the BID be established through
a public hearing process and petition that describes the BID boundaries, service plan, budget and
fee structure. The fee amount is established by the BID but cannot exceed ½2 of 1% (.005) of
the total assessed value of the real property and the BID may cap the maximum annual fee. The
petition must be signed by the owners of at least 60% of the real property and at least 51% of the
assessed valuation of the real property within the proposed boundaries. Once established the
municipality collects the fees and distributes them to the BID and may charge the BID a fee for
this service. Similar to city taxes, the municipality may place a lien on properties that fail to pay
the BID fee. The board of directors is responsible for overseeing BID activity, and unlike the
Ithaca, NY example, Chapter 400 does not require specific board composition.
The point of contention surrounding M.G.L. Chapter 400 is the outlined "opting-out"
period. The statute states that:
Any property owner within the BID may, within 30 calendar days after the municipality
declares the BID organized, elect not to participate or "opt-out" of the BID. By "opting-
out" a property owner is neither subject to the BID fee nor eligible to receive any of the
benefits or services of the BID. The property owner must notify the city/town clerk in
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writing of his/her desire to opt out. He/she may elect to participate in the BID at a later
date. Acceptance of participation in the BID is permanent until BID dissolution or
property transfer. Upon transfer of the property within a BID, the new owner has 30
days to "opt- out" of the BID.
Mike Zaleski explained that in Hartford, he was able to 'sell' the BID idea to property
owners by emphasizing that the model was an equitable way to revitalize downtown. In other
words, that even though a small number of civic organizations, the chamber of commerce, and a
few property owners had been continually investing in downtown, the BID model would make
this process fair; everyone pays and everyone benefits. Many scholars and authors agree that
fairness is one of the main reasons for forming a BID. As Gina Caruso and Rachel Weber
explain, "The model of voluntary improvement associations that are funded through an
involuntary assessment is an attractive middle ground between chambers of commerce (with
their associated 'free rider' problems) and unpopular property taxes." 57 Because of the opt-out
clause, BID proponents in Massachusetts benefit less from using this reasoning because it creates
the free rider problem Caruso and Weber mention. Although the legislation does say that
property owners who opt-out may not receive "any benefits or services of the BID," BID
directors argue that it is difficult to sweep around certain properties, deter crime in specific areas,
or provide capital improvements sporadically throughout a contiguous district. Property owners
are also more likely to be hesitant in opting-in, when they know their neighbor can opt-out.
At the same time, BID proponents trying to 'sell' this idea to property owners to bring
them on board in investing in the tool, may use the opt-out clause to their advantage, letting them
know that they should sign the petition because they can always opt-out afterwards. However,
this tactic can be self-destructive for smaller BIDs who rely on a certain amount of properties to
generate enough revenue to operate. While there has not been a large amount of literature
regarding the effects of BID legislation, Houstoun claims that when Massachusetts officials
drafted Chapter 400, "this statute ignored the time-tested principle of benefit districts by
allowing individual property owners to opt out of paying their share of costs. In the view of
many observers, this provision is why no BID has emerged in Boston and why only two
[currently three] have been formed in Massachusetts."58
57 Caruso, Gina, and Rachel Weber. "Getting the Max for the Tax: An Examination of BID
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This chapter examines the three existing BIDs that have emerged in Massachusetts-in
Springfield, Hyannis, and Westfield- in order to determine how this opt-out clause has affected
BIDs in Massachusetts and provide lessons learned to stakeholders in the Commonwealth's
communities hoping to form a BID such as Amherst, Taunton, Newton, Chicopee, Hingham and
Lawrence. Furthermore, stakeholders in the other Massachusetts forgotten cities of Holyoke,
Chelsea, New Bedford, and Fall River-where the need for commercial revitalization is greatest
but capacity is least-may also benefit from these lessons learned should they import the model.
Finally, this chapter makes a recommendation on how the Massachusetts BID enabling
legislation should be changed to better leverage BIDs as a mechanism for commercial district
revitalization in the Commonwealth.
Springfield
Springfield is a city in southwestern Massachusetts, along the Connecticut River, and is
considered one of two anchors of the Hartford/Springfield metropolitan area. Beginning in the
mid 1800s, Springfield's economy was based on large manufacturers of the industrialization era
including railway car, gasoline pump, automobile, and motorcycle manufacturers. The city's
nickname is the City of Homes, given during the late nineteenth century because of the city's
plethora of Victorian mansions and single-family worker homes developed during the
industrialization era. Within the last sixty years, the economy has slowly eroded as the
manufacturing industry closed their facilities, including the Springfield Armory (closed in 1968),
American Bosch (1986), and Danaher Tool (2005). Springfield has since struggled to fill the
manufacturing void with a service-based economy like larger post-industrial cities have. As jobs
left the city, the residential base followed. Large department stores in downtown could not
compete with suburban retailers and closed their doors as well. The Eastfield Mall, built on the
city outskirts in 1969, is now the major retail destination in Springfield, as opposed to
downtown.
According to the Census 2000, Springfield had 152,082 people living in the city. The
median income for a household was $30,417, and per capita income was $15,232. 19.3% of
families and 23.1% of the population were below the poverty line. If not for the extra 2,000
residents, Springfield would have been included in the forgotten cities category.
The Springfield BID was established in 1998 as the first BID in Massachusetts following
the 1995 enabling legislation. Ann Burke, now Vice President of the Economic Development
Council of Western Massachusetts, was involved in the formation of SBID. According to Burke,
the key proponents in forming a BID in downtown were a new mayor and a new economic
development organization, the Springfield Business Development Corp., of which she was a
part. 59 This organization began evaluating the feasibility of a BID in downtown Springfield in
January 1997 and in July 1997 received a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) from the city,
under then-Mayor Michael Albano, to provide "baseline-plus" city services that included
financial support of $100,000 annually. 60 Although signed by the BID president, several city
officials and the mayor, the MoU was not a binding legal contract, a fact that would cause
problems during the operational stages.
The BID proponents saw the model as the best way to provide a unified voice for
property owners and predictable funding for downtown to improve Springfield's position in the
regional marketplace as a center for commerce and entertainment. 61 Downtown Springfield was
anticipating change in 1997, with an expansion of the Civic and Convention Center, the
Basketball Hall of Fame, and a new Tourist Information Center. The BID was seen as a way to
"provide the supplemental programs and management necessary to capitalize on this important
opportunity." 62 But in the words of Houstoun, with opportunity also came fear.
Ann Burke, with the city's support and Memorandum of Understanding, had to educate
the property owners about the BID model in order to gain their support. Similar to the Hartford
BID, a small number of properties (four) make up the largest amount of SBID's budget (80%).
Ms. Burke was able to use support from MassMutual, who is the largest property owner and
made up about 20% of the budget, and the city seed money as leverage to convince other
property owners to buy into the BID. Ms. Burke explained that she made property owners aware
of the opt-out clause, but noted that this clause turned out to be a positive attribute to some
property owners who were hesitant on making a decision. In the end, she says, only about 12 of
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60 Springfield Business Development Corp. BID: Business Improvement District, Springfield,
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the 275 properties chose to opt-out, and this did not end up affecting the BID's formation.63
Jeff Keck, current Executive Director of SBID, explains that additional property owners
would have opted out had they understood the opt-out cause properly. Even though Keck was
not directly involved in the BID formation, he knows of about a dozen property owners who felt
Burke conveyed to them that they could opt-out after three years if they were dissatisfied with
the BID. He says that even today he deals with BID members that feel like Ann Burke deceived
them in order to get their signature and vote, but that resentment is "more of a grumble today as
an afterthought, but in the beginning it created poor business relations." 64 Even though the
legislation states that property owners can opt-in after they've initially opted-out, the reverse is
not true. Property owners signing the petition who do not opt-out after 30 days, are members of
the BID permanently, unless the BID dissolves or the property is transferred. The
Massachusetts legislation does require a specific accountability measure, that every three years
the BID Board of Director or his/her Designee shall update its strategic management, budget, and
services plan and that a copy of this strategy be sent to each BID member.65 But this measure of
accountability does not mean that members can opt-out if they are dissatisfied, as a few SBID
property owners felt they were led to believe, but only that the plans must be transparent to BID
members every three years.
Mr. Keck explains that the opt-out clause has not greatly limited SBID's performance, as
most of the property owners that opted-out are generally smaller properties or on the fringe with
the exception of one major property owner, the late Peter Picknelly of Peter Pan Bus Lines, who
opted-out five of his six properties. In the early stages of operation, when the dozen or so
properties learned that they could not opt-out after 30 days and that Picknelly was not paying his
fees, "some voiced that they would go to him [Picknelly] and start the petition to disband the
BID [but] it never happened" 66 The fact that this never happened and that some, but not most,
property owners neither felt "duped" nor opted-out reflects that the BID is working for most
members. Keck thinks that the property owners that chose to opt-out did, and still do, not have a
clear understanding of what the BID can actually do for them. At the same time, Keck cannot
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completely avoid graffiti removal or trash pick-up in front of these few properties, so they do
benefit without paying.
Other property owners in downtown Springfield have elected to opt-in; a telling sign that
SBID is improving the downtown neighborhood and providing property owners a return for their
investment. Still others, like the Picknelly family, are only partially in. Jeff Keck explained that
one developer bought an entire block of property in the heart of downtown and believed in the
BID model but did not want to deal with another bureaucratic organization, so he has held his
largest property out until he sees the return on his investment in the smaller properties.
The skepticism of property owners in the effectiveness of the BID is especially complex,
as outlined in the forgotten city case studies, when the city has limited resources. Property
owners associate the BID with a city government that they already feel is not doing enough for
them. Meanwhile, the success of a BID is hard to measure when larger factors-job growth,
crime, homelessness, and the economy as a whole-are out of the BIDs control, but greatly
affect the property owners' expectations of increased entertainment and commerce activity and
decreased crime and vacancy in the district.
Since SBID's inception, Springfield has had to endure an economic downturn that
exceeds that of most forgotten cities. Still, the organization has been able to weather what could
have been a larger storm in their public-private partnership. Former Springfield Mayor Albano,
who was a proponent of SBID's inception and signed the MoU, was involved in a federal
corruption probe and accused of over-spending and relying too heavily on state aid by the State
Department of Revenue.6 Consequently, $3.4 million of state funding was cut in 2003, the
municipality laid off 287 employees, the city's bond rating plummeted to just above junk and the
state eventually took control of the city's finances in 2004 under a new agency, the Finance
Control Board.
Keck admits that the city's federal probe and state takeover has affected the work of the
BID, especially because the BID was seen as part of the agenda of the old mayor, who had a
tainted reputation. When Mayor Ryan came into office in 2003, SBID held monthly meetings
with him in order to gain his support for what the BID was achieving in downtown. Keck says
that the new mayor wanted control over downtown, but also had to reduce spending because of
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the fiscal crisis. Ryan lowered the amount of BID financial support from the city because of the
fiscal crisis and spent a year rewriting the Memorandum of Understanding with the BID. The
city and BID were never able to reach a new understanding and neither party signed Ryan's
MoU. The primary reason why BID members and staff were displeased with the new MoU was
because the language changed from holding the city accountable to baseline services (the
original MoU's intention) to holding the BID accountable to economic development goals and
city oversight. Keck believes this language change was due in part to Ryan not having a clear
understanding of what the BID could do and how the city could utilize the BID in its economic
development strategy.68 While Ryan was able to balance the city's budget, Keck explains that
the retraction of city services caused crime to go up.
Springfield serves as a prime example of the sometimes inverse relationship between the
services of a city and a BID. SBID has been able to provide services to property owners that
have been especially important in a city undergoing a fiscal crisis and "because of the fiscal
crisis, the BID had to increase its operational budget twofold (more cleaning, more security,
more landscaping, etc)." 69 Keck explains how the city pulled baseline services in the district
despite the MoU, writing, "The [city government] started slowly siphoning city services down to
minimal and then when the financial problems came to a head during Mayor Ryan's
administration, all city services pretty much came to nothing (except police). This was the very
thing the BID membership was fearful of, and it happened, regardless of the MoU."70 When the
city resources get weaker, BID services can get stronger, but the reverse is also true. Keck
explains that as the services that SBID provides increase, the city services are sometimes used
elsewhere and he is "always trying to get the city to do what it's supposed to."7 1
Keck says he hopes for a change with the new administration, under Mayor Sarno, who
took office in January 2008. He explains that Sarno has an appreciation for the services that the
BID provides in downtown and the impact it has been able to make thus far. He writes, "because
of the new mayor and the mutual respect, the board of directors are reconsidering the budget
outlay and hope to now use the funds as they were intended to (not to supplant city services but
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to augment them)." 72
Hyannis
Hyannis is the largest of seven villages in the town of Barnstable in Cape Cod,
Massachusetts. Hyannis is a major tourist destination, due to its beach, fishing and boating port,
ferry connections to the islands of Nantucket and Martha's Vineyard, and two major retail
districts-the Route 132 commercial district and historic downtown Main Street. While the Rt.
132 retail is made up of suburban footprints-big box stores and strip malls with parking in front
along a busy route, Main Street Hyannis, a business improvement district, has the ambiance of a
walkable small New England town. Cynthia Cole, Hyannis Main Street Business Improvement
District (HMSBID) Executive Director, describes Main Street as "a good retail mix of locally
owned shops, restaurants and services. The majority of the street caters to both summer and year
round residents but many could not succeed without the influx of summer residents and
tourists."7 3 She says that many people are surprised to hear that Hyannis's year round residents
are a mix of wealthy, middle class and poorer residents.74
HMSBID was formed in 1999 "in response to the need to carry out the Hyannis
Renaissance." 75 The idea for a BID came from the private sector, as a committee made up of
Chamber of Commerce members researched the concept following the 1995 state enabling
legislation. The committee then brought the idea to the town to gain assessed value information
and technical assistance. While the town was able to provide assistance in formation, Cole
stresses the importance of having the idea come from the private sector and particularly, the
peers of other property owners. Rick Penn, owner of Puritan of Cape Cod and the largest
property owner, was chairman of the BID committee and other property owners were influenced
by his willingness to invest in downtown. Cole says that about 35% of property owners were
immediately engaged but about 35% were hesitant. She was hired to provide outreach and
education to the hesitant property owners and she says she used the opt-out clause to her
advantage if a property owner expressed concern about not being able to make up his or her
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mind about BID buy-in. She told them they could sign on now and then decide last minute to
opt-out if they needed to. Because Springfield's BID was not operational at this time, Cole had
to look outside the state for examples and used Burlington, VT's Church Street as a model. She
put together a selling kit with renderings of what the BID could do for downtown Hyannis, and
saw resistance from property owners decreasing. The entire BID formation process took about
three years, but about a year of that was trying to get the second batch of signatures from
property owners. Finally, the BID was approved with 75% of property owners signing the
petition and 10% of property owners opting out. Cole says if she had to do it over again, she
would talk to the Springfield BID proponents and compare ways in which BID outreach and
education was conducted in order to gain support from property owners. At the time, however,
there were no technical assistance services available to potential Massachusetts BID stakeholders
from established BIDs that formed under the Massachusetts enabling legislation.
Cole says that the opt-out clause has been difficult for her district because the opting out
property owners have been essentially getting a free ride. She says some BID services are easy
to target only to members, such as marketing of specific businesses, while others, like signage
and street beautification, are harder. Even still, HMSBID has had an enormous impact on the
area. Since its inception, the BID has been able to provide a voice for property owners in
regulatory issues and government relations, leverage nearly $2.5 million in capital
improvements, provide business development, attraction, and technical assistance services, as
well as marketing, security, maintenance, and beautification services. 76 HMSBID has been able
to accomplish all of this with two full time staff members and two part time staff members,
generating revenues of about only $140,000 annually. HMSBID occasionally receives small
grants from the town for a specific purpose, but for the most part has been able to successfully
write grants (although Ms. Cole says she urges BIDs to form as 501(c)3s instead of 501(c)6-
HMSBID's structure-because this allows for more leverage in raising capital). Since inception,
two major property owners have since opted-into the BID, a true testament of the success of a
renaissance in downtown Hyannis.
Westfield
Westfield, a suburb of Springfield, is located in southwestern Massachusetts at the
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western edge of the Connecticut River Valley. The town is bordered by linear cliffs that are part
of a larger mountain range along the Northeast. Despite Westfield's recent commercial and
residential land development, Westfield still boasts significant amounts of undeveloped forests.
In the 19th century, the manufacturing industry was prevalent in Westfield and the town
was named "Whip City" due to the buggy whip industry presence in the 1800s. Today, the city
is mostly home to workers who commute to Springfield, but has a significant college population
(15%) due to Westfield State College. In 2000, the median income for a household in Westfield
was $45,240 and the median family income was $55,327. About 6.9% of families and 11.3% of
the population were below the poverty line.77
Westfield, with a population of 40,072, is the newest community to form a BID in the
Commonwealth, having done so in June 2006.78 In 2004, the Chamber of Commerce, with
support from the city, commissioned a BID feasibility study. The Chamber hired Ann Burke,
who formed the Springfield BID and is now working with Northampton to conduct the feasibility
and outreach of the model, as a part time consultant. 79 Unlike Hyannis, the key proponents for a
BID were not specific property owners but the Chamber of Commerce. Still, the Chamber was
an organization that represents the private interest and does not look as though they are trying to
pass city services to potential BID members. Lisa McMahon said that the Chamber saw the
potential for downtown and commissioned a number of reports and studies of the area. Although
these reports illustrated ways in which the downtown could use this potential by creating a
strategic roadmap for revitalization, McMahon says they ended up sitting on a shelf because the
district lacked resources for implementation.
The Chamber and Ann Burke were able to use these revitalization plans to their
advantage in gaining support for the BID. A major reason the BID proposal passed was that
many of the district property owners were also involved in these master plans that sat on a shelf.
BID proponents convinced them that this was the best tool to promote a shared strategic vision
for downtown. 80 Burke and the chamber also went to the boards of major institutions in town,
including the YMCA, the hospital and Westfield State College and gave a presentation on what
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the BID could do for the district. When certain property owners remained unsure or unwilling to
participate in the BID, these proponents would think about whom these people respect and sent
them to foster support.81 These tactics worked because the Westfield Council voted to establish
the BID in September 2006 and operations began in early 2007. 82 The district boundaries
include 191 member properties and an additional 33 that have opted out. Even though this BID
has a larger membership than Springfield, because they do not have large office towers like a
large downtown commercial center, they have 1 /2 0 th the size of Springfield's budget. 83
During the planning process the BID proponents wanted the boundaries to be larger than
they currently are but had to retreat over a particular bridge because of lack of support. Two
property owners-one who owned a historic train station that is now home to an insurance
company and another, a candle company-wanted to be included in the district. Yet because
their neighboring property owners said they could not afford the fees and because the proponents
needed a certain percentage of support to pass the City Council, these property owners were told
they could not be included. "I wish I could put banners and flowers there," McMahon said. 84 If
not for the opt-out clause, these property owners who wanted to become part of the BID would
have been able to.
The opt-out clause has also created resentment among property owners because unlike
Springfield with a number of corporate property owners, Westfield is a small town where,
McMahon explains, "everyone knows everyone." Community members know who opted-out
and this creates tensions when members feel they are making the extra effort in investing in the
district and picking up the slack of their opting out neighbor.
Even in the early operational stages, McMahon has been frustrated by the implications of
the opt-out clause in service delivery. Like Keck and Cole, she says there are some services she
cannot justify delivering only to members. McMahon uses snow blowing as an example,
explaining that pedestrians shouldn't have to trudge through a neglected building on their way to
another shop in the district. She says that yes, she can avoid graffiti or trash removal at certain
properties, but she is "trying to create a look" of a cohesive district so it is difficult to do so and
neglect certain properties. Both McMahon and Cynthia Cole of Hyannis' BID see the opt-out
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clause as such a problem that they recently met with a state senator to try and get the legislation
changed.85
Despite the opt-out clause, and even though the BID has only been in operation for a year
and McMahon is the only person on staff, her energy and enthusiasm for the BID have been
paying off. She's had seven or eight merchants (not property owners) ask her if they could
become part of the BID, a sign, she says that she is bringing positive attention to the businesses
in the district. Still, property owners remain skeptical due to the opt-out clause, with one
property owner telling her, 'until everyone is in, I won't be.'
Opt-out Implications for Massachusetts
Ann Burke downplays the opt-out problem saying, "In a perfect world, Massachusetts
would do better without the opt-out clause...but this hasn't been the experience of the three BIDs
here." 86 She explains that in Springfield and Westfield, a relatively small number of property
owners have opted out and that the BIDs have been able to achieve success in the management
of their districts by providing a number of services. In reality, she says, the people who opt-out
still receive services anyway. The real problem with the opt-out clause, according to Burke, is
that it scares people away from forming a BID. Communities do not want to spend the time and
money conducting feasibility studies for a year or two when the opt-out clause does not allow the
district to get off the ground. But this is a misperception, she says. The opt-out clause can
actually help communities form when they have property owners who are hesitant.
She is correct that this clause can be used to the BID proponents' advantage in gathering
signatures-sign now and you can opt out later-but is this fair? All three BID directors in the
Commonwealth have admitted that they cannot really divert resources away from these property
owners and they benefit from services that are financed by others. And as the Westfield case
illustrates, opting out of a district can cause resentment amongst property owners, especially in a
smaller city.
The counter argument is that certain property owners may not be able to afford the fees
and should be able to opt out. In the Westfield example, had the opt-out clause not been in
effect, the property owners included in the original larger boundary would have had to pay the
85 Ibid.
86 Phone Interview with Ann Burke.
fee, regardless of their financial ability to do so. For small businesses struggling to keep their
balance sheets "out of the red," especially in lower-income communities, this can be a legitimate
concern. However, according to the Massachusetts law, "if a building owner can't pay the BID
fee they can apply for hardship and can either pay a scaled back amount or none. Westfield has
done this with several building owners," explains Emmy Hahn, the Coordinator for the
Massachusetts Downtown Initiative of the Department of Housing and Community
Development.87 Clearly, the intention of a BID is to increase business and property values and if
the majority of properties could not afford the fees in a district, a BID would not be an
appropriate revitalization tool.
All of the BID directors interviewed for this thesis tended to agree that outreach and
education was key in gaining support from property owners forming a BID. The reason why
outreach is so important is because asking property owners to tax themselves additionally can, in
concept alone, cause an immediate negative reaction. As Mike Zaleski of Hartford bluntly
stated, "no one wants to pay more taxes." Education will circumvent the usual arguments of
'I'm not paying for what the city should do.' Emmy Hahn explains that the reason the opt-out
clause was put into the legislation was to put to rest the fears of additional taxes. "At the point
that the legislation was passed there was a strong feeling that it was a tax and not a fee for
service," she wrote. "The powers that be at that time felt that the best way to deal with the
perception that it was a tax was to allow people to opt-out. You can't opt-out of a tax, was the
reasoning." 88 But Hahn admits this is no longer the sentiment, "It is interesting how things
change. If the legislation was passed today, I don't believe it would have the opt-out. Fee for
service is very popular now and people believe it should include everyone that it applies to.""89
Opposition of the BID model diminishes when stakeholders see the successes in
neighboring communities and want to transfer the tool to their own. All BID proponents
interviewed for this thesis agreed that the most effective way to gain support for a BID is to teach
stakeholders what the tool can do by showcasing successful models. But when none of these
models are close to home, they fall below the radar for many communities. As Anne Burke
explained, "it's like we're ten years behind the times" noting that most states have a large
87 Email from Emmy Hahn, Coordinator for the Massachusetts Downtown Initiative of the
Department of Housing and Community Development, to Laura Rothrock, 13 May 2008.88 Email from Emmy Hahn to Laura Rothrock, 12 March 2008.
89 Ibid.
number of BIDs and some cities alone have multiple BIDs, such as Philadelphia with 14, San
Diego with 18 and New York with 59. Burke says that because there are so few BIDs in
Massachusetts, more outreach to property owners is required because they are not as familiar
with what the model can achieve and haven't seen its results from nearby competition. Jeff
Keck agreed that a lack of BID support from Mayor Ryan and the opting out of property owners
was due to a lack of understanding of the tool. He says many of his members still don't
understand what the BID can do. Yet if there were a number of operational BIDs in
Massachusetts, stakeholders would have a trust and understanding in the model. To that point,
Burke claims that one main reason why there are so few BIDs in the Commonwealth is not
because of the opt-out clause, as many critics argue, but because Boston, the face of downtown
in Massachusetts, does not have a BID.
But is Boston's lack of a BID because of the opt-out clause? Boston has tried numerous
times to form a BID in their downtown retail district, Downtown Crossing. The idea was first
proposed in 1997 at the suggestion of Mayor Menino, and a coalition of property owners put
together a plan, which passed city council. However, because their plan required a change in the
opt-out legislation so that no property owners could opt out, the proposal required oversight from
the State House, where the momentum was halted. "By exposing the BID to the Legislature," an
article in the Boston Business Journal stated, "proponents put it in the path of the powerful
Boston Police Patrolmen's Association, which held up the legislation in the late 1990s over
worries that their members would be replaced by private security patrols." 90 Whether or not the
opt-out clause caused Downtown Crossing's BID demise, Burke affirms that if it forms, other
communities in Massachusetts will soon follow.
And form they just might. Mayor Menino, according to a December 2007 city press
release, announced plans for a BID for Downtown Crossing "that would generate millions in
annual revenues to fund continued investment that would continue Downtown Crossing's
transformation from a retail-only district to a mixed-use center of city life." 91 However, if the
mayor and BID proponents in Boston encourage a Home Rule Petition again to avoid property
owner opt-out, the state legislature may again rule against the BID.
90 Mason, Edward. "Bid for Hub Business Improvement District All But Dead." Boston
Business Journal. 7 May 2004.
91 "Mayor Menino Delivers Annual Address to Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce." City of
Boston's Mayor's Office. 11 December 2007.
Even though a Downtown Crossing BID has yet to get off the ground because of the opt-
out clause, the three Massachusetts BIDs are existing and successful despite it. Emmy Hahn
says the clause can be problematic, but not a reason for communities to avoid the tool. 9 2 And
while Springfield and Hyannis went out on a limb to be the first two communities to form in the
state, others, like Westfield, can use these two case studies, and the failed attempts of Boston, as
an example of how the opt-out clause might affect formation. The fact that the Westfield
community was willing to put money up front to hire Ann Burke for the feasibility study, despite
the few examples in the state, shows that they were not completely fearful of the clause.
Furthermore, a handful of new communities are testing the BID waters in the state, including
Northampton, Amherst, Taunton, Newton, Chicopee, and Hingham, a telling sign that the idea is
picking up momentum.
Still there is work to be done in outreach and education and Emmy Hahn says that the
Commonwealth has never really gotten behind the BID idea. She said she tries to get the word
out about BIDs by publishing a new manual and visiting communities at the request of the city or
civic organizations to explain the BID model, but she is still only a "one-woman show" at the
state level. And while there has been a push to change the opt-out legislation, from the
Downtown Crossing effort to Cole and McMahon meeting with state officials, both Hahn and
Burke were hesitant to say this would occur any time soon. Hahn did say that if the legislation
does change, those BIDs forming under the opt-out provision may get grandfathered in, which
doesn't help the immediate cause of McMahon and Cole.
So is the Massachusetts BID legislation faulty? For BID Directors, definitely yes. Keck,
Cole and McMahon all agree that the opt-out clause does make it difficult for BID services and
benefits to be fair and equal and that their budgets, and maybe their boundaries and services,
might be improved if everyone was in. But for property owners, the legislation is also faulty.
Even though Ann Burke says that the clause helps property owners who are hesitant about the
BID, it also seems to create confusion and resentment. In addition to what Keck alluded to as a
misunderstanding of when members could opt-out, Hahn says that when properties transfer
ownership there is also confusion. New owners are allowed to opt-out within 30 days, but many
don't know this and try to opt-out four or five months later. This misunderstanding can also
create resentment in the community and, if new owners opt-out within 30 days, BID budgets and
92 Phone interview with Emmy Hahn, 1 February 2008.
services may have to be altered suddenly. Property owners are also likely to be resentful if they
are financing services for their neighbors who chose to opt-out of the fee.
Does the opt-out clause prevent BID communities from forming? Yes, because BID
organizers are afraid that the time and money they invest in importing the tool will go to waste if
property owners opt-out. There is a catch-22 occurring in the Massachusetts BID void.
Organizers are hesitant to conduct outreach about BIDs in fear of the opt-out clause, but the opt-
out clause has also caused fewer property owners to have an understanding of what the model
can do and therefore requires more outreach. As Ann Burke admits, communities in
Massachusetts require much more outreach on the model than elsewhere.
Admittedly, I have only interviewed Executive Directors and BID proponents and not
property owners. So the notion that 'they don't know what is best for them because they don't
understand the model' may sound presumptuous. In the end though, whether or not the BID
model is best for a community, BID proponents need property owner buy-in and should not only
conduct educational outreach about the tool, but also really 'sell' the idea by using other
successful BID models as examples. Therefore, although BID planners should be honest about
any downfalls the model might have, they still need to be enthusiastic and should avoid, as
Houstoun calls it, "excessive caution" when trying to sell this idea.93 Telling property owners
they can opt-out if they don't agree does not exactly make the case for the power of a BID. This
lack of enthusiasm from BID planners encouraging stakeholders to "opt-out later," coupled with
few examples of BIDs in Massachusetts, makes it difficult for property owners to want to buy-
into the model and transfer the tool to their districts.
The irony of the Massachusetts legislation is that while it may have been crafted with the
opt-out clause to deter the perception that a BID is a tax, it has actually required more outreach
and education to convince property owners that a BID is, in fact, not just an increase in taxes for
city services. The opt-out clause has also proven to cause inequality, resentment, and confusion
amongst property owners in the three operational Massachusetts BIDs. Although Anne Burke's
assertion that three BIDs have been able to form and operate under the current enabling
legislation is valid, these districts would be more effective if they were not limited by the opt-out
provision. In order to most effectively utilize BIDs as a revitalization tool in Massachusetts,
lawmakers should remove the opt-out clause in the state enabling legislation.
93 Houstoun, Lawrence.
In the meantime, stakeholders in other communities in the Commonwealth interested in
importing the tool to their communities should look at lessons learned from Springfield,
Hyannis, and Westfield, summarized below, to determine how best to transfer the model despite
the limitations of the opt-out provision.
Figure 5: Key Lessons Learned from Massachusetts' BIDs
players on board early.
2) Not properly explaining
the opt-out clause for BID
advocate's advantage will
cause property owner
resentment later.
3) An understanding between
the city and BID should be
a binding legal contract so
baseline services will not
change with a new
administration or fiscal
crisis.
4) The BID can withstand a
city fiscal crisis but BID
and city services will have
an inverse relationship.
5) It is impossible for opting-
out property owners not to
receive services and
benefit from the BID.
when it comes from a
property owner.
2) Using model BIDs in a
'selling kit' encourages
property owner buy-in.
3) BIDs should form as a
501(c)3 to fully leverage
grant-writing ability.
4) It is impossible for opting-
out property owners not to
receive services and
benefit from the BID.
who participated in district
market analyses by
encouraging them that a
BID is a tool that can
implement study
recommendations.
2) Use key institutional
players to gain support
from property owners.
3) Without large corporate
members, larger
boundaries can still mean
smaller budgets.
4) In small Massachusetts
cities where property
owners know each other,
the opt-out clause creates
resentment.
5) It is impossible for opting-
out property owners not to
receive services and
benefit from the BID.
Chapter V: Lawrence in Context: History, Demographics, and the
Evolving/Transforming Mill District
As several BID Directors interviewed for this thesis expressed, a BID is not a saving
grace to downtown revitalization, but is a piece of the puzzle that utilizes private and public
investment of time and money. Houstoun stated that cities form BIDs amidst fear and
opportunity. Many cities transfer the tool because they think the BID model may be the extra
push their districts need to turn new investments (opportunity) that face a void in resources (fear)
into district revitalization or renaissance.
Is the downtown Lawrence, MA mill district experiencing a renaissance? A number of
new mills in the process of redevelopment from vacant or underutilized spaces into housing,
office, or mixed-use properties point to this community's rebirth. Of course, implicit in the
definition of the word 'renaissance,' is that the community was once without life or vigor. To
understand how and why Lawrence, and most especially the downtown mill district, might
experience an economic and social revival is to understand its rise and fall in history.
In the mid 1800s, a group of wealthy Boston industrialists, headed by Abbott Lawrence,
searched for sites where they could establish textile mills near ample sources of waterpower.
They found such a site along the Merrimack River in Massachusetts, and incorporated the city of
Lawrence in 1853 out of parcels taken from the surrounding communities of Methuen and
Andover. Lawrence became a planned industrial city made of mills and canals built along the
Merrimack. The city earned its nickname "the Immigrant City" by attracting thousands of
laborers from all over the world. Immigrants from Ireland, Italy, Canada, and Germany, to name
a few, came to Lawrence seeking the American dream and took part in the industrial revolution
working in these mills along the river. By the 1900s, Lawrence was an economically thriving
city; home to the cotton and wool textile industries94.
The decline of the textile industry beginning in the 1950s eroded Lawrence's workforce
and population. The federal government declared Lawrence a disaster area due to
unemployment rates in the 1950s95 and the population fell from over 80,000 residents in 1950 to
94 Cole, Donald B. Immigrant city: Lawrence, Massachusetts, 1845-1921. Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1963.
95 Lawrence History Center Newsletter. "Urban Renewal." Lawrence History News 4.1: 2005.
approximately 64,000 residents in 1980.96 The outsourcing of this industry also marked
Lawrence with abandoned or partially vacant mills concentrated in the downtown along the
Merrimack River. Like many U.S. cities suffering from a post-industrial economy after World
War II, Lawrence city officials made several controversial revitalization efforts in the name of
urban renewal. In the 1950s, half of one of the largest mills in the world, the Wood Mill, was
demolished. In the mid-1970s, large sections of downtown Lawrence were razed and replaced
with parking lots and a three story parking garage.
Lawrence suffered further devastation in the 1980s and 1990s. While Lawrence lost
nearly half its manufacturing jobs in the 1970s and 1980s, another 20 percent of its employment
base was lost in the recession of the early 1990s. 97 During this period the city became known as
the arson capital of the country, with over 200 buildings set afire during an eighteen-month
period in 1991-1992. The city had other notorious claims to fame as well, including "the auto-
fraud center of the country and a place where businesses went to die.""98 Not only were the
commercial centers plagued with rising violent crime rates and vacant storefronts and mill
buildings, but also the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had to establish a fiscal oversight board,
as the city could not maintain its budget, and the Department of Education threatened to take
over the distressed school system.
Today, the city presents with similar, albeit improving, statistics. With a population of
72,043 according to the Census 2000, the median income in Lawrence in 2006 inflation-adjusted
dollars is $31,276 compared to $50,502 in Massachusetts, and 37.5% of residents have no high
school degree. 99 According to the Department of Education, only 41% of the Lawrence high
school class of 2006 graduated in four years, which is about half the statewide average of 80%.
The unemployment rate in Lawrence is an unadjusted 12% in January 2007, which is double the
state's 6% rate during the same period. 100 Affordable rental housing has long been lacking in
Lawrence and the city is 5 th in the Commonwealth in foreclosure filings with 700 filings in
96 Plastrik, Peter and Madeleine Taylor. Lawrence Community Works: Using the Power of
Networks to Restore a City. Barr Foundation, 2004.
97 Butler, Britta. ReWorking the City of Workers: A New Housing Paradigm for the Immigrant
City. MIT Master's Thesis, 2003.
98 Porter, Paula and Tom Duggin. "The Revival of Lawrence." Valley Patriot March 2006: 18.
99 United States Census Bureau, Census 2000
100 Kolluri, Mini. "Lawrence Unemployment Rate Continues to Rise." The Eagle-Tribune. 10
March 2007.
2007.101
Demographically, Lawrence is still an immigrant city, although the countries of origin
have changed. Immigrants from the Dominican Republic began entering Lawrence in significant
numbers during the 1960s. Today, Lawrence has a Hispanic majority. Almost 70% of residents
are non-white, 30% are foreign born, and of the immigrant residents in Lawrence 70% are from
the Dominican Republic. 02 Tensions between the Hispanic community and Caucasian
population erupted as this new wave of immigrants emerged, and these tensions reached an all-
time high during race riots in 1984. A racial disconnect in the city remains, as David Holtzman
explains, "immigrants from the Dominican Republic have given new life to the once-moribund
downtown, opening hundreds of small businesses there and in surrounding neighborhoods. But
in City Hall, the old guard still holds sway, and there has long been a sense of disconnect
between the needs of the young immigrant population and the political leadership."' 03
Despite Lawrence's rise and fall, many property owners and residents are hoping the city
is on the brink of a renaissance; and they have reason to believe so as crime rates are dropping
and new shops and restaurants and coming into the city. The downtown mill district in particular
has recently seen millions of dollars in investment from the private and non-profit sectors.
The downtown mill district owes much of its investment to the Reviviendo Gateway
Initiative (RGI), a community planning effort, launched by grassroots community organizations
and a diverse group of businesses, institutions, residents, and non-profits. These stakeholders
partnered with the city government to make the vision of downtown Lawrence "as the historic
heart of an international city-a place that is vibrant, dynamic, diverse and proud"1 04 a reality.
These efforts resulted in the 2003 Reviviendo Gateway Overlay District, the first major zoning
change in the city since 1946 that allowed residential uses along the North Canal in the former
commercial-only district. Residential uses encourage private investment in Lawrence, as
developers see opportunity in the mills to rehabilitate these mammoth historical structures into
housing or commercial spaces. This trend is occurring throughout post-industrial cities in the
United States. Many developers see these properties as opportunities to create housing for the
101 Union Crossing, Lawrence: Project Summary, 8 February 2008.
102 U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000.
103 Holtzman, David. "Back From the Brink." Shelterforce Online. March/April 2005: 140.
104Clark, Heather. Redeveloping Lawrence, Massachusetts' Historic Mill District: Insights into
Adaptive Reuse in Untested Residential Markets. MIT Master's Thesis, 2004.
'yuppie software developer looking for the urban lifestyle,' the 'newly formed family looking in
the urban rental or condominium market' or the 'empty-nest baby boomers looking to downsize.'
Residential uses in the Lawrence district can also mean a 24-hour live/work urban core that is
dense and walkable. Residents in the mill district on the nights and on the weekends not only
mean a safer downtown, but also a downtown that will most likely attract complimentary
businesses such as restaurants and cafes.
The first major project utilizing the Reviviendo Gateway Overlay District was the
rehabilitation of Washington Mills Building #1 into rental apartments. The Architectural
Heritage Foundation (AHF), backed with community support and financial support from the
Bank of America Community Development Corporation, completed the renovation of the
240,000 square foot building that was on the brink of full vacancy. The project brought over $40
million in investment and created 155 households in the mill district. The units are designed for
flexible live/work utilization to "help nurture small businesses and provide further stimulation to
the local economy." 105 The Washington Mills opened in the summer of 2007 and rented about
half the units in the first five months.
After a successful initial lease-up of the Washington Mills, the Architectural Heritage
Foundation also purchased the Morehouse Bakery at the comer of Mill and Methuen streets in
December 2007. In addition, they have an agreement to buy the 150,000-square-foot Pemberton
Mill from Iron Mountain, a data storage company that currently uses the building as a records
warehouse. AHF plans to convert the old bakery building into a satellite campus for the
Cambridge School of Culinary Arts, and the Pemberton Mill into a hotel. 10 6 Both uses would
bring activity into the mill district and are consistent with RGI's vision for a vibrant downtown.
A hotel will allow the district to have more of a 24-hour community feel, while the culinary
school could spur future restaurant activity in the district.
Other developers are following suit in the trend set by the community RGI vision and
AHF and even more housing may be available in downtown Lawrence in the near future. Forest
City Enterprises, a leading national developer, plans to develop The River Mill at 240 Canal
Street into a 280-unit apartment complex. The projected $70 million project will hopefully bring
105 Kirk, Bill. "Cleveland Development Giant Closes in on Riverfront Mill Purchase." The Eagle-
Tribune. 3 February 2008.
106Benton, Nelson. "My Take: Old Mill Would Make Grand Hotel." The Eagle-Tribune. 3
February 2008.
residents to downtown Lawrence. While the developers are planning to demolish the one-story
mill, the decision on demolition will be left to the National Park Service, as the company used
historic tax credits upon purchase.1 07 Forest City does not envision the project to open until
mid-2010, but the city and community are already excited about the investment in the city and
the impact the development will have on the livelihood of the mill district.
Another mill redevelopment project that excited the Lawrence community is now on
hold, however. Millionaire developer Bob Ansin purchased the Wood Mill on Merrimack Street
in October 2003 and has begun developing the mill into a mixed-use project called "Monarch on
the Merrimack." The $200 million "green-technology" project planned for more than 600
residential loft condominiums and upscale retail businesses, including a jazz club, a cyber caf6,
and a kosher deli. During Phase I of the development, more than 550 people from 70 cities in
12 states put their names on a waiting list to live in the Monarch lofts. A major setback recently
occurred, however, when the local daily newspaper, The Eagle-Tribune, reported contractors
were not being paid and asbestos was found in the building. While the asbestos was actually in
a land pocket outside the building and the newspaper printed a correction, a major lender and a
number of loft buyers pulled out. 10 8 The project is now on hold and it is uncertain what will
become of the property until financing is secured. The project may have to convert to rentals in
order to support construction costs with the limited funding.
College Street LLC, owners of the Malden Mill, plan to transform the old Arlington Mills
complex into a mixed-use environment that will support between 500 and 600 mostly rental
housing units. According to their website, the developers plan to "transform more than 1 million
square feet of aging and underutilized mill buildings into a vibrant, pedestrian-friendly mixed-
use development."' 0 9 In meetings with city officials, College Street explained they plan to
partner with an affordable housing developer and the city is confident the housing reuse will help
in revitalization of the district. 110 Although this new investment is an important part of the
Lawrence renaissance, the complex is located outside of the immediate mill district along the
'07 Kirk, Bill. "Cleveland Development Giant Closes in on Riverfront Mill Purchase." The Eagle-
Tribune. 3 February 2008.
108 "Down but not out." Merrimack Valley Magazine, November 2007.
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110 Chelf, Stephanie. "Developers Forced Out of Malden Mills: New Owners Plan to Build
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Merrimack. Therefore, Malden Mills will not likely be part of a potential contiguous BID
boundary made up of properties concentrated downtown.
While a national corporate presence is lacking in the Lawrence mill district, The New
Balance Corporation is the exception that makes it all but absent. The company has spent more
than $17 million in renovations to their property in the mill district. New Balance is expanding in
research and development, manufacturing, and retail on the site, and has additional expansions
planned for the future. The Merrimack Valley Community Foundation Inc. has invested $1
million in the Ayer Mill, where New Balance is headquartered, installing new windows, and
spearheading a major renovation of the clock tower, which is a landmark in the Merrimack
Valley. "'
While New Balance may be Lawrence's exception to a corporate presence, and Forest
City may be the exception to a national developer presence in Lawrence, some local property
owners have taken revitalization efforts into their own hands. Chet Sidell, former owner of a
garnet manufacturing company, along with Gary Sidell, have invested over $5 million in the
KGR Mill building at 60 Island Street, turning one of their old manufacturing sites into an office
building. The building, as well as their property at 56 Island Street, now houses over sixty
tenants comprising of a mix of doctors, artists, non-profits, software and advertising companies.
Their largest tenant, Cambridge College, is a four-year institution offering mostly night and
weekend classes.
On the other side of the canal from KGR, Sal Lupoli purchased the Riverwalk Mills on
Merrimack Street and has created "Sal's Riverwalk." Mr. Lupoli has invested $15 million in this
project and created more than 200 jobs. The once vacant mill building now houses a number of
commercial uses including the Merrimack Valley Credit Union and Sal's Restaurant. 112
Sal's first tenants at Riverwalk, brothers Lou and Juan Yepez, owners and founders of the high
tech company Mainstream Global, saw Mr. Lupoli's success and decided to buy and redevelop
the Plymouth Mill at 25 Marston Street. They plan to convert the property into 100,000 square
feet of high-end office space and aim to attract professional tenants, especially doctors who
"' Porter, Paula and Tom Duggin.
112 Ibid.
conduct business at nearby Lawrence General Hospital."113
While a Lawrence renaissance may be in the preliminary stages, many wonder if the
downtown mill district will revitalize the community, or become another community. The fear
is that loft-style developers will attract young professionals who will leave Lawrence to work
and socialize in Boston. This demographic might not help residents of Lawrence, but rather
outside professionals looking to own a piece of less expensive real estate outside, but still in
proximity to, the more expensive Boston market.
Lawrence Community Works (LCW), a resident-led non-profit community
development corporation (CDC) who spearheaded RGI, has begun a new initiative to redevelop
mills along the Merrimack in an effort to juxtapose the Monarch and Washington Mill projects
that they categorize as "loft-style developments with the minimum affordability required, and are
geared toward drawing young professionals and empty-nesters into the city".14 LCW wants to
"ensure that tapping the potential of the mill buildings-one of the City's great assets-will
benefit and create rising value for all our residents and families, regardless of income."115 The
group has a long track record of affordable housing development and community planning in
Lawrence. The CDC has developed a membership of more than 2,200 residents, a staff of 21 and
an annual budget of nearly $1.5 million. To date, the group has generated over $12 million in
neighborhood investment, all under their mission of equitable, sustainable, community-driven
development in Lawrence.
In 2007 LCW purchased the Southwick Mill, a 215 thousand square-foot building, for
redevelopment. This acquisition is part of a larger vision to create a vibrant ambience in the
downtown Lawrence mill district called Union Crossing, along with development partners Chet
and Gary Sidell (redevelopers of 56 and 60 Island Street) and Juan and Lou Yepez (redevelopers
of 25 Marston Street). Union Crossing will be a 400,000 square-foot mixed-use development
located in the heart of the North Canal Historic District and will include the redevelopment of
adjacent mill buildings-the Duck Mill at 4 Union Street and 220 Canal Street-as well as
construction of three new buildings, on 8.5 acres of land. The Union Crossing proposal includes
residential opportunities for families and workforce dedicated housing (150 to 165 units; mixed
113 Kirk, Bill. "Joining the Mill Club: Yepez Brothers Just Latest in Long Line of Developers
Eager to Share in Success of City." The Eagle-Tribune. 15 May 2007.
114 Union Crossing, Lawrence: Project Summary, 8 February 2008.
115 Ibid.
income) commercial and medical space, day care, parking and green space around the
Merrimack River. The basic program and phasing of this large-scale project is as follows:
Figure 6: Basics of Union Crossing Project Phasing and Programll6 :
LCW is taking the lead on the residential development, while the Yepez brothers and
Chet and Gary Sidell are working to develop the commercial components. Similar to LCW, the
commercial partners have a strong track record in growing and nurturing local businesses that are
generating net new jobs for Lawrence and the Commonwealth.
The $75 million investment will change the ambiance of Union Street dramatically and
restore vigor into this area that has been quieted with the outsourcing of the manufacturing
industry. "We're building a neighborhood," said Maggie Super Church, Union Crossing Project
116 Ibid.
PHASE ONE (targeted construction start of 2009)
50 Island Street (Southwick Mill)
* Approximately 40 units of mixed-income family rental housing
(townhouses and flats) for Lawrence General Hospital employees,
visiting employees, and other workforce members (Building 9, floors 3-
5)
* A new 12,000 sf day care center (Building 9, floor 2)
* Approximately 80 at grade parking spaces (Building 9, floor 1)
* Approximately 65,000 sf of new commercial space in Building 4
PHASE TWO
4 Union Street (Duck Mill)/220 Canal Street
* Approximately 70 units of mixed-income family and workforce housing
* Ground-floor commercial space (office, institutional, retail)
* New parking and riverfront access
50 Island Street- Agawam Dye Works
* Approximately 36,000 sf of new community space (health/ wellness)
and/or parking
PHASE THREE
New construction on Island Street
* Approximately 12,000 sf of new commercial/ retail space
* A~ii~rr~v~mot·1~'IA 0AAA of nf ",Ai ~i xt ,1rfrr-, hrivo;
Manager for LCW. "Housing, shops, services, outdoor space and parks." 117 The project will not
only provide new housing, offices, and retail, but also turn part of a parking lot into a raised city
park and create an estimated 200 jobs. The photograph and rendering in Figure 7 below
illustrate the vision for Union Crossing.
Figure 7: View from Union Street Before (above) and After (below) Union Crossing
Credit: Jeff Shumaker, Illustrator
While mill owner and Union Crossing partner Chet Sidell says, "In my opinion, there
will be more development going on in the next ten years in the mill district than we've seen in
the past 40 years," "18 it is apparent this is not just his opinion. But with large amounts of
investment pouring into the mill district, and a city government with limited resources, LCW is
looking for a way to best take advantage of this opportunity and ensure that other investors and
117 Kirk, Bill. "Mill City Makeover: Southwick Clothing Complex to be Reborn as Union
Crossing." The Eagle-Tribune. 6 April 2008.
118 Interview with Chet Sidell, KGR, 8 February 2008.
developers look 'beyond the lot line' and not just redevelop, but revitalize the district into a
lively, walkable community where people enjoy working, shopping, dining and living.
A BID seems like the appropriate tool to achieve these goals, especially because most of
the recent investments have taken place in the same vicinity, in mills clustered together in the
islands surrounding the Merrimack River (see Figure 8 below). But as a forgotten city in
Massachusetts, what is the best approach in implementing the BID model, based on the case
studies outlined in this research?
Figure 8: Aerial Parcel Image: Recent/ Pipeline Developments, Lawrence Mill
District
Key:
O 270 Canal Street (Washington Mills #1)
60 Island Street (KGR, Chet and Gary Sidell)
50 Island-Southwick (LCW owns, Union Crossing)
216 Canal Street-Pemberton Mill (AHF)
9 Mill Street-Morehouse Bakery (AHF)
240 Canal Street-Forest City
250 Merrimack Street-Monarch on the Merrimack
5 Union Street-Ayer Mill (New Balance)
354 Merrimack Street-Sal's Riverwalk (Sal Lupoli)
25 Marston Street--(Plymouth Mill, Yepez Brothers)
4 Union Street/-Duck Mill (phase III Union Crossing)
220 Canal Street-(phase III Union Crossing)
56 Island Street-Chet and Gary Sidell (Essex Art Center)
Chapter VI: Conclusions and Next Steps
With the amount of development both occurring and in the pipeline in the Lawrence mill
district, Maggie Super Church, Community Development Consultant to Lawrence Community
Works (LCW) and the Union Crossing Project Director, saw an opportunity to coordinate the
Union Crossing team's investment with others in the district, to create a more cohesive
community. A Business Improvement District (BID) seemed like an appropriate tool because, as
she wrote:
A BID seems to provide the greatest flexibility, autonomy and level of control in relation
to the City [so] we can move forward somewhat irrespective of City capacity [and]
commitments. A BID also provides a formal management structure for financing and
strategic planning (versus a more ad-hoc group). Finally, BIDs are non-profit entities
that can hold and manage public funds as well as their own fees, which positions us to
seek additional support from state and federal funding sources. 119
Maggie Super Church and LCW epitomize the four criteria, outlined by Houstoun in
Chapter I, necessary for a primary sponsor organization for the mill district BID. With their
long track record of community organizing, interfacing with property and business owners and
city hall, and providing direct benefits through initiatives such as affordable housing, collective
economies, and education, LCW is a very appropriate sponsor because they already have
community trust and respect. Maggie Super Church has assembled a team of consultants to
assist her in the feasibility study and planning of a BID in the mill district. Fred Faust, President
of the Edge Group, a real estate consulting firm serving the Merrimack Valley, and Kathy
McCabe, a private economic development consultant in Massachusetts, will serve as the primary
BID consultants and assist Ms. Super Church in the BID planning stages. This thesis has been
formulated with these clients, "the BID team," in mind to provide recommendations on how to
engage stakeholders interested in establishing BIDs in Massachusetts as well as forgotten cities
in other states.
In the case of Lawrence, a combination of fear and opportunity has lead stakeholders to
consider a BID. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Lawrence has experienced similar
economic and social trends that have influenced BID formation in a number of North American
119 Email from Maggie Super Church to Laura Rothrock, 3 December 2007.
cities including the offshoring of manufacturing jobs, urban renewal, and the upsurge of
suburban housing, office and retail development. This combination of factors has left the city's
once thriving mill district with high vacancies, dilapidated infrastructure, and quiet streets. Even
though new investment is pouring into the mill district rapidly, property owners and investors are
still taking a risk, and fear they will not see the expected returns on their investments. On the
other hand, these stakeholders also see the mill district as an opportunity with untapped potential,
or else they would not choose to invest the large amounts of time, energy, and money that they
have in the mill district.
Individual investors may see potential in their historic and symbolic mill properties along
the canal, but unless improvements are made beyond their lot lines, their properties may not
become part of a larger walkable and thriving community. Capital improvements, district
promotion, and the attention of state and local policy makers are just some of the much-needed
services a BID could leverage and provide. With these services in place, property owners will
not only see a greater return on their individual investments, but also the larger community's
investment. The district's potential, combined with limited city capacity, creates the perfect
storm to utilize a BID as tool for revitalization in Lawrence.
But BID stakeholders in Lawrence face a dilemma. BID formation is difficult for
stakeholders in Lawrence on two levels: 1) Massachusetts legislation, which allows property
owners to opt-out after district formation; and 2) "forgotten city" status, or small, poor and post-
industrial characteristics that create a power struggle between a city government with limited
resources and property owners who have the most capacity to provide public benefits for their
district.
Massachusetts Legislation
The widely accepted view from BID proponents in literature and practice is that BID
services are strictly supplemental to city services and do not provide services that government
should provide; that an urban district can become more competitive in the regional marketplace
by using an accepted practice from their suburban competitors: a common area maintenance
(CAM) fee. These pro-BID arguments are used to dissuade the common misconception of the
model: that it is an additional tax on property owners. Property owners are less likely to
maintain this misconception if they see how the tool has revitalized other downtowns. Instead,
the tool spreads like wild fire when districts want to compete with their neighbors, as in cities
such as Philadelphia, with 14 BIDs; San Diego with 18 BIDs; Los Angeles with 37 BIDs; and
New York with 59 BIDs. In Los Angeles alone, there are currently 19 BIDs in the proposal
stages-evidence that there is a demand from property owners to import the tool to compete in
the marketplace because they have seen the model transform neighboring districts. 120
Yet with only three examples of BIDs in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, the model
is not spreading quite like wild fire because the opt-out legislation makes tool transfer difficult.
This is because cautious BID proponents don't want to spend the time and money to plan a BID
if property owners can then legally opt-out of it. As the Massachusetts case studies outlined in
Chapter IV illustrate, BID organizers are stuck in a catch-22: they are hesitant to conduct
outreach about the tool in fear that stakeholders will opt-out, but the opt-out clause has also
caused fewer property owners to have an understanding of what the tool can do and therefore
requires more outreach to them. Ironically, legislation intended to ensure property owners that
BID fees are voluntary and not a tax has caused BID planners to have to advocate even more for
the model and illustrate that the BID is not a tax, but an innovate revitalization tool. Therefore,
additional education to stakeholders is even more necessary in transferring the tool in
Massachusetts for two reasons. First, to educate property owners about what the BID model is
and second, to convince them that the tool is in both in their own and the district's best interest.
Even though the three Massachusetts BIDs have been able to successfully manage and
provide services to their districts, the executive directors admit that their districts are not
equitable when by law, BID boundaries must be contiguous but individuals can opt-out.
Therefore, when property owners choose to opt-out, they still are able to reap the benefits that
their neighbors are financing. BID organizers in Massachusetts are not armed with pro-BID
arguments used in other states, for example, that the tool solves the free rider problem of
continuous economic development measures from the same few property owners or civic
organizations. The Massachusetts BID legislation has created additional problems such as
resentment and confusion. In Springfield, property owners were confused about the opt-out
clause and thought they were free to opt-out or in as they pleased. This lack of understanding
later created some resentment and distrust in the tool. In Westfield, a small town where property
120 Los Angeles Office of the City Clerk website, cityclerk.lacity.org/bids/bidgeol_pro.pdf.
owners know each other well, the tool has caused resentment amongst those who have opted in
against those who are not paying for the improvements.
Forgotten Cities
Even if BID organizers are able to educate property owners that the model is in their own
and the district's best interest and that the tool does not replace city services, in cities with
limited government capacity, the latter may not be entirely true. In these cities, investment is
lacking and there is a struggle to control what investment exists. As the Springfield example
illustrates, when the city pulls back resources, the BID gets stronger and when the BID gets
stronger, the city pulls back resources. Mike Zaleski of Hartford explained that the public-
private partnership is a balance of power where the city has the ultimate control. He is right that
BIDs need the city government, however, particularly in forgotten cities, the city also needs the
BID. If a city pulls back resources, the BID may need to get stronger but if a BID pulls back
resources, the city may get weaker with more crime, vandalism and less business activity and
street traffic.
Property owners should then use their organizational capacity to leverage bargaining
power with the city. They should not allow the city to dictate BID activity as in the case of
York, Pennsylvania's BID. One way to solve this problem is by producing a protection
mechanism for property owners, such as the Conditional Agreement in the Hartford case
(Chapter III, Figure 3), that describes what services the city will maintain (in addition to
baseline, if possible), any financial support the city might provide, and the specific relationship
and roles of both parties. From the BID member perspective, city engagement and commitment
to baseline services will defeat the notion that the city will relinquish responsibility to the private
property owners. From the city perspective, transparency and a written understanding will allow
city agencies to not only be informed about BID goals and activities but also support the BID as
part of a larger economic development agenda. However, it is equally important that this
document be a legal contract so that the city's baseline services do not retreat from the BID
specifically upon municipal financial hardship. These agreements should also be a component
of the BID's structure, as submitted to City Council for authorization and reauthorization, so the
contract does have to be rewritten when administrations change.
Even though the Commonwealth's legislation does not require city representatives to sit
on the board of directors, if a member of City Council insists on sitting in on board meetings of
the BID (a reasonable request if the city provides technical or financial assistance), the BID
should not be used to drive the city's agenda and the BID director or board members should be
allowed to sit in on meetings in City Hall. Ithaca Downtown Partnership's relationship with the
city government serves as a perfect example of how best to maintain this transparency. In the
end, both the city and property owners are striving for the same goals-to improve the position
of the commercial district-whether by increasing property values, attracting street traffic,
improving cleanliness or decreasing crime. Where this goal gets sidetracked is in the struggle for
power, and both parties need each other and therefore need to balance that power.
Some BID proponents might argue that under no circumstances should city government
sit in on BID meetings or have any say in BID activity; that a BID is purely property owners'
relinquishing control over economic development activity with their own money in ways that a
city can't and never should; that BID services are purely supplemental to city services in the way
that CAM fees are placed on tenants in a mall. As noted in the Massachusetts examples, many
BID organizers need to make these promises to property owners during the outreach phase in
order to assure property owners that a BID is not a tax. But this type of outreach and education
is equally pertinent in forgotten cities. Limited city governments may already impose high taxes
to make up for budget deficits and property owners in these districts may feel they would take
their business elsewhere before they would succumb to additional taxes. In order to ensure their
buy-in, BID proponents many times guarantee that property owners will have complete control
over BID activity and that the city will not change their services in the area-but this is
misleading in forgotten cities. Unless, of course, the city and the BID have an understanding of
what the city's role will be in the district early on in the planning stages.
While many BID proponents interviewed for this thesis stressed that the idea for a BID
should not come from the public sector because the tool will look like a guise for another tax, the
public sector should be involved in the planning process from the beginning to define this
partnership. If the city commits, at minimum, a Memorandum of Understanding to provide
baseline services in the district, property owners will have more trust in the investment
partnership. Although the CAM analogy resonates with business-like property owners, a city
district is not a mall, but public space, and the best way to manage public space using the BID
model is through a clearly defined public-private partnership. In this way, the two entities can
work together towards the same goals (as in the case of Ithaca) rather than against each other (as
in York, Pennsylvania).
Implications for Lawrence
Considering these barriers, what is the best solution for utilizing the tool in forgotten
cities in Massachusetts such as Lawrence? Because a city like Lawrence has limited municipal
capacity to revitalize the downtown mill district, Maggie Super Church and LCW are justified in
thinking a BID will be an appropriate tool for revitalization that is "somewhat irrespective of the
city." During the planning stages of BID formation, it is important, of course, to determine if a
BID is feasible by drawing boundary lines and adding up assessment data. However, the case
study BIDs in forgotten cities and Massachusetts demonstrate that outlining an understanding of
the public-private partnership and conducting outreach to property owners about the BID model
with this understanding in place, is just as important.
Non-profit organizations in Lawrence have historically had a complicated relationship
with the city government. Civic organizations such as LCW have made immense impacts on the
city with respect to affordable housing, community development, infrastructure improvements,
and lobbying local and state officials, but they have always had to remain mindful of the balance
of power. They do not want to undermine City Hall by completely going around the public
entity to make improvements in the city, but at the same time they realize that the city does not
have capacity to implement plans like the private and not-profit side does. David Tibbetts,
General Counsel for the Merrimack Valley Economic Development Council, explains that the
relationship between the city and LCW and other non-profits is a complicated web of resentment
and respect. The city is aware that LCW has both a large constituency and more capacity in
implementing planning and development initiatives. He says there is always a fear of the
organization's capacity from the city side. While LCW has steered clear of involving themselves
in political campaigns, Tibbetts says the fear balances the power relationship between the two
groups. 12 1 In other words, the city government may have executive control over non-profit
planning initiatives, but also knows LCW holds a powerful rapport with community members.
121 Phone interview with David Tibbetts, General Counsel, Merrimack Valley Economic
Development Council. 5 March 2008.
LCW is the perfect sponsor for a BID organization because they are the glue that pieces together
the "disconnect between the needs of the young immigrant population and the political
leadership," as explained by David Holtzman. But, as Holtzman says, "the old guard still holds
sway" and Ms. Super Church understands that a BID in the downtown mill district needs public
support. Yet she also is remaining mindful of the complicated political networks and tug of war
for control in Lawrence.
For example, the city has commissioned MassDevelopment, the state's quasi-private
economic development agency to produce a downtown master plan. Unfortunately, LCW, other
area civic organizations and property owners have not been informed of or involved in the plan
that will affect their investments. 122 A BID in the mill district has the potential to leverage
additional investment and serve as an anchor to MassDevelopment's master plan. Yet if the two
parties are unwilling to share information and a strategic vision and goals, efforts may be
duplicated and control over planning and development will be a point of contention.
Ms. Super Church does point to the Reviviendo Gateway Initiative (RGI), the community
planning process focusing on revitalizing the Canal District, as a successful public-private
initiative. Several city agencies partnered with LCW and Groundworks Lawrence, another city
community organization, to engage the community in a process that ended with the adoption of a
zoning overlay for the mill district, which allows residential uses in the mills. Ms. Super Church
hopes that a BID can follow a similar trend to RGI in a successful public-private partnership. In
order for this initiative to do so, the BID proponents must get the city on board with the district
plans and potential. They must be willing to show what a BID can do for the city, but also ask
what the city will do for the BID. Both parties must be willing to share service and investment
responsibilities, economic development goals, and participate in knowledge and information
sharing.
One current initiative that the city has been transparent about is the redevelopment of
downtown Essex Street. Essex Street, which is adjacent to the mill district, used to be the 'Main
Street' equivalent in the city, as it saw tremendous day and evening footfall when people came to
this destination for services, shopping, dining and entertainment. Although Essex Street is still
lined with a mixture of local shops, like the mill district, the corridor has experienced a
significant decline in businesses and traffic in the last three decades. However, the mayor and
122 Phone conversation with Maggie Super Church, 7 March 2008.
city officials have leveraged $1.2 million, mostly in federal grants, to revitalize Essex Street.
Banners now line the area proclaiming the street the city's "Historic Downtown District," and a
new traffic calming initiative will turn the busy one-way street into a two-way, more shopper-
friendly district. 123 The city is also spearheading business attraction, capital improvement and
fagade improvement initiatives. The redevelopment plan on Essex Street may be the perfect
opportunity for stakeholders to gain city buy-in for a BID in the mill district. Improvements in
the neighboring downtown districts could tie into each other to make for an overall downtown
revitalization strategy. Additionally, because the city has limited financial resources, municipal
capacity can be concentrated on Essex Street, while property owners leverage investment in the
mill district through the BID tool.
Once the BID team has brought the city on board and has the city's responsibilities in
writing, they will have more ease in bringing the property owners on board also. This isn't to
say that sponsors should not engage any property owners before negotiating with the city. As the
Hartford, Springfield, and Westfield cases demonstrate, many times select property owners are
immediately engaged and can be used as leverage and secure support from their neighbors. In
the case of Lawrence, the BID team has already begun outreach to a core group of property
owners who they knew would be amenable to the idea. This includes LCW's partners in the
Union Crossing deal--Chet and Gary Sidell, and Lou and Juan Yepez-as well as the
Washington Mills partners--the Architectural Heritage Foundation and Bank of America, whom
they already have a positive relationship with. These stakeholders have agreed to financially
participate in the BID feasibility study, a positive sign that they see the potential that the tool can
have on the mill district.
As has been done in BID formation across the country, the BID team in Lawrence must
educate additional property owners about the tool by showing them success stories of how BIDs
have transformed downtowns throughout the country. However, outreach is especially important
in Lawrence, where most property owners are unfamiliar with the tool's potential. As a
community in Massachusetts, the BID team must also make property owners aware of the opt-
out clause but encourage them not to take advantage of the allowance. BID advocates must be
weary of using the clause to their advantage only to gain signatures. Telling property owners
they can "sign now and opt-out later," as the Springfield case illustrates, can cause resentment
123 Contreras, Russell. "Downtown Byway Gets a New Look." The Boston Globe. 3 April 2008.
when property owners don't understand that they can't just opt-in and out of the levy. If
property owners believe they were mislead with the opt-out clause, they are more likely to resent
the fee, even if they do see a return on their investment.
One main challenge for a BID in Lawrence may be property owner resentment, but not
only due to a lack of understanding of the opt-out clause, but also because of the free rider issue
that is more troublesome in small cities. David Tibbetts thinks the BID model will not work in
Lawrence for this reason. He says there are several property owners who have put large amounts
of investment into the district, such as the Sidells and Sal Lupoli, while others have resisted. He
says that because of small town politics, it is difficult to get two property owners in Lawrence to
agree on a single plan, let alone an entire district plan, and the opt-out will only encourage this
discord. He sites an example from several years ago when MassDevelopment and his own
organization were proposing a parking management program behind the Everett Mill, an
initiative similar to the BID concept. The idea was that a parking lot in this location could
benefit the surrounding mills and those property owners would pay for parking management and
be entitled to a certain number of spaces in return. When Bert Pailey, who owned the Everett
Mill and was the largest property owner in the deal, walked away from the deal, others also
walked away.24 Tibbetts explains that some property owners feel they have put in enough
investment into the district and the time has come for others to do their share.
Another example of some property owners not pulling their weight involves an ongoing
dispute over a bridge in the mill district. Iron Mountain, the global data storage company that
owned the Pemberton Mill (now acquired by AHF), has been under court order for some time to
rebuild a dilapidated bridge over the North Canal. Chet Sidell brought them to court because he
could not gain legal access to his property at 220 Canal Street by way of Iron Mountain's
decaying bridge. Sidell was quoted in the local paper as saying, "they wouldn't fix it, so I had to
force them to go on record they would do that," and adds, "to date, they've been people of their
word."' 25 The city was also pushing for the bridge project and Iron Mountain property manager
Doug Barry said he thought he had the problem solved after "more than a year of negotiations
124 Phone interview with David Tibbetts.
125 Kirk, Bill. "Building Bridges to the Future; With the City's Help and Private Investment,
Lawrence Mill Island Ripe for Development." The Eagle-Tribune. 19 June 2007.
with city officials and adjacent property owners."l 26 However, after Iron Mountain spent
$500,000 on a new bridge, both the city and Chet Sidell remain unsatisfied that they decided on a
single lane structure. 127
The two examples of infrastructure cost responsibilities illustrate how particularly in
small cities with limited investment and development activity, the city and property owners are
more likely to struggle over who should be obligated to pay for improvements. While the BID
model has been a successful tool in these situations to ensure that district investment and benefits
are equally distributed, Lawrence and other cities in Massachusetts do not have this benefit.
Even if property owners sign the petition, they may be weary that neighbors will opt-out after 30
days, which will cause more hostility.
A BID in Lawrence is still feasible, but as a forgotten city in Massachusetts, proponents
will have to work twice as hard to overcome barriers to tool transfer. These two characteristics
will not allow the model to sell itself to property owners as a common ground between, as
described by Caruso and Weber, a chamber of commerce laden with free riders and an unpopular
tax increase. Instead, to property owners in Massachusetts' forgotten cities, the tool can become
some combination of these two extremes.
In BID formations across the country and world, planners conduct outreach with BID
stakeholders by illustrating how the model has leveraged investment and services in other
districts or cities, and import the model by way of tool transfer. Because different communities
have different goals in forming a BID and BID legislation typically allows members to conduct a
wide variety of services, it is important for BID advocates to illustrate the model to property
owners with examples of how the model has achieved 1) similar benchmarks as those that are
appropriate for the community in question and 2) success in communities with similar
demographics and characteristics. For example in Lawrence, illustrating how BIDs have
transformed large downtowns such as Times Square is not as effective as showing how the
model has achieved success in smaller cities with similar post-industrial characteristics, such as
those outlined in this thesis. Secondly, once the core property owners in Lawrence determine
specific services and goals of the BID, such as capital improvements, cleanliness, or increased
1 26 Kirk, Bill. "Dispute Arises Over New Bridge Near Pemberton Mill." The Eagle-Tribune. 3
February 2008.
127 Ibid.
foot traffic, the BID team will want to conduct outreach by illustrating how similar goals were
achieved in other BIDs. Qualitative achievements are important, but quantitative measurements
resonate further with business-minded property owners. The ability of the Ithaca BID to leverage
$100 million and the Hyannis BID to leverage $2.5 million in investments for their districts is a
quantitative measurement of success that illustrates how property owners can achieve a return on
their investment in the BID. In order to gain property owner buy-in, BID planners must educate
property owners that the model will be not only in the community's but also the property
owner's best interest.
The Lawrence community will have to take this outreach a step further and really turn
education into advocacy for the model because of the challenges they face as a forgotten city in
Massachusetts. The best solution for the Lawrence BID team is to advocate not only for the BID
model, but also the city's partnership and understanding and the reasons why this tool will be
successful if property owners do not opt-out. Instead of telling property owners that they can
sign now and always opt out later they must make them aware that the legislation is faulty and
they should opt-in. At the same time, BID proponents will not want to use "excessive caution"
and scare property owners away from the tool when pointing to all the flaws in the opt-out
clause. This hesitance is one reason why BID consultants say there are so few BIDs in
Massachusetts. To achieve this balance between advocating against the opt-out and scaring
people away from the model, BID planners should explain that Massachusetts is atypical for
allowing property owners to opt-out of an individual and community investment; that other
states' enabling legislation is written to favor BIDs and has allowed the model to spread rapidly;
and that the legislation in Massachusetts was originally intended to protect property owners but
has ironically had the opposite effect. If Massachusetts property owners are educated about the
legislation's shortcomings but also understand that a BID can succeed despite them, they will be
more likely to trust the model will give them that return on their individual and communal
investment. In essence, proponents in Massachusetts will have to not just educate but also
advocate for both the BID model and not opting out of it.
Conclusions
In summary, both of the obstacles to tool transfer in Lawrence-state enabling legislation
and forgotten city status-can be overcome through one methodology: property owner and
municipal outreach, education, and buy-in of the BID model. As Paul Levy wrote, a BID, in
concept alone, is unusual as "normally tax-averse business people--corporate property owners
and managers, and small retailers-are choosing to be assessed an extra mandatory charge." The
concept is no longer so unusual in part because the tool has been transferred around the world
and the model is now seen in the economic development community as a reliable revitalization
tool. Yet for stakeholders in Massachusetts, BID education and outreach are particularly
important because the concept is still unusual. Property owners generally still lack an
understanding of the model and are weary that the tool is simply a guise for another tax. BID
advocates, on the one hand have to rely on faulty legislation to lay the groundwork to explain the
model, but on the other, have few in-state examples to rely on. Therefore, stakeholder outreach
is even more necessary to prevent property owner resentment and confusion. Although a BID is
feasible despite the opt-out clause, the legislation is faulty because it prohibits the formation of
districts in Massachusetts and causes confusion and resentment in operational BIDs. State
officials should take action to remove the opt-out clause from the enabling legislation in order to
fully leverage the potential of this economic development tool for the Commonwealth.
In forgotten cities, where local governments have limited resources, a balance of power
in the public-private partnership through transparency, collaboration, and a written agreement of
BID and city responsibilities is essential. This balance of power will grant BID members some
autonomy from city control but will also allow the two interests to work together towards similar
goals. Outreach to city officials to secure their buy-in to both support the BID and commit to
baseline services and funding is influential (and may be conditional) for property owner buy-in
of the model in forgotten cities.
Typically, BID planning consists of feasibility studies, to determine boundaries and
assessments that will determine the BID's budget and services. While property owner buy-in is
important during any BID's formation, in Massachusetts' forgotten cities buy-in is even more
important than formulating boundaries and assessments because city and property owner support
is likely to determine feasibility. The BID planning steps outlined in the manual from the
Massachusetts Department of Housing and Community Development (in Figure 1, Chapter II)
are typical of BID planners throughout the country and abroad. However, in Massachusetts and
forgotten cities, additional steps are necessary. The flow chart below (Figure 9B) is meant to be
a supplement to Figure 1 for such cities as it illustrates how BID advocates can think about
conducting vital outreach to property owners and the city in order to both transfer knowledge and
gain support for the tool.
Figure 9: Difference in BID Planning Stages for Massachusetts' Forgotten Cities
A. Typical BID Formation Steps
A. Planning Stage: Conceptual
o Form a sponsoring organization with a board of directors of membership that
is representative of the property owners and tenants in the district.
o Develop list of services that the BID could provide.
o Describe possible boundaries of the district.
o Make estimates of the revenues that could be generated at different levels of
assessment.
o Evaluate the impacts of different levels of assessment on individual property
owners.
o Determine what level of services can be funded at various revenue levels.
o Prepare conceptual service plan.
B. Planning Stage: Advanced
o Prepare a preliminary plan and budget that includes a description of services
and costs and the proposed district boundaries.
o Test-market the plan and budget in a meeting and in door-to-door
discussions with the property owners and merchants in the proposed
district. (See Supplement below, Figure 9B, for how this step differs in
Massachusetts and forgotten cities).
o Finalize a multiyear plan and budget that includes an estimate of the costs for
each property owner.
o Prepare a feasibility study that documents why the recommended services are
needed and summarizes the planning process to date.
B. The Massachusetts and Forgotten City BID Planner Outreach Supplement
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In summary, are BIDs an effective revitalization tool for Massachusetts forgotten cities?
Yes, BIDs in the case study cities have been able to leverage investment in the form of capital
improvements, beautification, maintenance and security services, and business and customer
attraction. Springfield is an especially pertinent example to Massachusetts' forgotten cities since
the city's qualification as 'forgotten' is a technicality of about 2,000 additional residents.
Stakeholders in Springfield have been able to import and utilize the tool, which, albeit with some
difficulty, has been able to withstand a fiscal crisis in the municipal government.
However, the tool clearly cannot be effective if it does not form or dissolves due to a lack
of understanding of what the model is and how it can be used most successfully. If stakeholders
are hesitant to initiate the feasibility process because of the opt-out clause, or, once formed,
property owners wish to dissolve because they feel they are manipulated by a city agenda, the
model will not reach its full potential. In order for a BID to reach its full potential and be most
effective in the revitalization of Massachusetts' forgotten cities, two factors are essential: 1) a
public-private balance of power via a legal contract signed by members of the city government
and BID in forgotten cities and 2) stakeholder education of the faulty enabling legislation,
successful BID models in districts with similar characteristics and goals, and advocacy to not
opt-out of the district in Massachusetts.
One limitation to this research is a comparative performance evaluation of each case
study BID. Future research on BIDs' effectiveness in revitalizing Massachusetts' forgotten cities
might conduct a comprehensive evaluation of case studies that determines if there is a clear
relationship between 1) stakeholder outreach and public/private agreements during the BID
planning stages and 2) performance evaluation (such as amount of investment leveraged) during
the operational stages. Such future research might determine if and how the opt-out clause
hinders formation in the communities in Massachusetts-such as Northampton, Chicopee
Amherst, Taunton, Newton, and Hingham-that are in the planning and formation stages now.
Additional research in Massachusetts BID planning could also aid the case for the removal of the
opt-out clause from the state enabling legislation.
If the BID team in Lawrence is able to overcome the barriers to tool transfer as a
forgotten city in Massachusetts through stakeholder outreach, the public, private and non-profit
partners should also not forget the lessons learned from case studies outlined in this thesis. If
BID and city services are clearly outlined to supplement each other, then economic development
goals and actions of these two parties must supplement each other as well. Let the hindsight of
BID Directors in forgotten cities and in Massachusetts become examples of how to best transfer
the model as a tool for public-private economic revitalization, despite the obstacles against them.
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